Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/21 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100270005-0

JAPAN 16841

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JAPAN 16841

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/21 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100270005-0

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/21 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100270005-0

Form 40 Cleared

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE: 21 JUNE 45

FROM: BERN, SWITZERLAND

PRIORITY
ROUTINE
DEFERRED

TO: OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

IN-16633

DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION	FOR INFORMATION
X-2	DIRECTOR, MAGRUDER

RECEIVED IN CODE OR CIPHER

SECRET

SECRET

#11057. SAINT. REFERENCE OUR #10589 (IN-14918) FROM 110.

OUR 673 REPORTS THAT FUJIMURA, WHO IS IN CLOSE TOUCH BY CABLE WITH TOKYO, IS INSISTANT THAT BEFORE JAPANESE SURRENDER THEY WOULD REQUIRE ASSURANCE THAT EMPEROR WILL BE ALLOWED TO REMAIN. FUJIMURA HAS BEEN READING ACCOUNTS IN LOCAL PRESS OF 110(S PART IN CAPITULATION OF GERMANS IN NORTH ITALY AND IS ASKING WHAT TERMS SHORT OF UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER WERE GRANTED TO THEM.

This 2153 21 JUNE 45

FILE COPY

SECRET

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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/21 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100270005-0

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE 5 June 1945

FROM

LISSAC LISBON

XXX	PRIORITY
	ROUTINE
	DEFERRED

TO

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

DISTRIBUTION

IN 15120

FOR ACTION	FOR INFORMATION
DIRECTOR (1)	

TOP SECRET

RECEIVED IN CODE OR CIPHER

TOP SECRET

#2339. SAINT. Action: Washington. Information: London, #2529.

Inoue, counselor CG legation, asked BD/711 to put him in touch with an AF agent in United States through whom CG agents there can report military information here via W/T. BD/711 temporized and asked me for instructions. He is to see Inoue June 11th and unless you instruct to contrary tell him matter will take time and ask him meanwhile for questionnaires. I suggest you inform me earliest possible name and address of someone in United States who can be contacted by CG agents. Perhaps FBI can help. Chicken food could then be sent here by cable and given to an agent of ours here to turn over to Inoue. Local agent could be introduced to Inoue by BD/711. Please answer urgent.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

COPY 1

CM: 1103 5 June 45

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TOP SECRET

SIGNATURE RECORD SHEET

To be prepared by each TSCO upon receipt of a TOP SECRET document.

DESCRIPTION	REGISTRY
SOURCE: Ben Director	ACCESSION NO. 149/8
ADDRESSED TO: Director	ACCESSION DATE. June 3
DOCUMENT DATE: June 2	OFFICE OR BRANCH Director's office
DOCUMENT NO.: 10979 COPY NO.: 1	LOGGED BY. Frances Parker
NO. OF PAGES: 1 ATTACHMENTS:	

ATTENTION:

The TSCO named below is responsible for the attached TOP SECRET document until it is charged to this Office or Branch. On receipt of this document from another TSCO, he must prepare this form on which, according to TOP SECRET regulations each person who uses the document or to whom its contents are communicated, must sign with the date and time received, and initial with the date and time of release in the spaces provided opposite his name. This document may be shown only to persons authorized to see TOP SECRET documents, and who are required to know the information within its contents. Each person formally charged with the safekeeping of this document or any TSCO in his Branch or Office is responsible for and must return the document to the TSCO before further routing.

The attached document was received from the _____ (Branch or Office). Courier Receipt No. _____

	REFERRED TO	RECEIVED			RELEASED		
	NAME	SIGNATURE	DATE	TIME	INITIALS	DATE	TIME
1.	Exec						
2.	Chief						
3.	DD/P						
4.	C/I			1220	CIA		1240
5.	DDR	Everett K. Radford		1230	EKR		1145
6.	DD/I	Lyman Kirkpatrick	June 3	1145	LKK	June 3	
7.	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
8.							
9.							
10.							
11.							
12.	TSCO						

In case of the RELEASED addressee(s) fail(s) to read this document, the TSCO must sign on the dotted line(s) below and detach it as a permanent record of the fact. He must then deliver the document by Officer Courier to the next TSCO listed on the second routing sheet attached to this document.

The attached document was released to the _____ (Branch or Office), Courier Receipt No. _____

TOP SECRET

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

TOP SECRET

DATE 2 June 1945

FROM Bern, Switzerland

PRIORITY
ROUTINE
DEFERRED

TO OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

IN 14918

DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION: Director (1) (2)

FOR INFORMATION:

RECEIVED IN CODE OR CIPHER

TOP SECRET

#10589. From 110. Reference our #10009 (IN 12800)

Our 673 is in touch here with Fujimura understood to be one of chief representatives in Europe of Japanese Navy and formerly Assistant Naval Attache Berlin. Fujimura is supposed to be in direct and secret cable contact with Jap minister of Marine and believed to have confidence of Jap Government. He indicated to 673 that he believed Navy circles who now control present Jap Government would be willing to surrender but desire to save some face out of wreckage if possible. In particular they stress necessity save Emperor as otherwise communism and chaos will ensue. He also stresses that Japan cannot supply itself with primarily essential foodstuffs without former as sugar and rice from Korea and that they need to retain some of their merchant marine for necessary food imports.

TOP SECRET

[redacted] THIS CABLE
THE SECRETARIAT

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/21 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100270005-0

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/21 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100270005-0

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE 23 MAY 45

FROM

PARIS, FRANCE

XX PRIORITY

ROUTINE

DEFERRED

TO

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

DISTRIBUTION

IN 14160

FOR ACTION	FOR INFORMATION
DIRECTOR	SECRETARIAT

RECEIVED IN CODE OR CIPHER

SECRET

SECRET

#1394. TO BUXTON AND CHEETON FROM 109.

BE CERTAIN THAT LISBON-WASH #2309 (IN 13934) IS COMMUNICATED TO PRESIDENT AND JCS. ALSO COMMUNICATE LISBON-LONDON #2469 (MESSAGE NUMBER UNAVAILABLE)* TO PRESIDENT AND JCS.

SECRET

WHITE WASHINGTON #2219 (IN 14099).

WHI 2306 23 MAY 45

FILE COPY

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SIGNATURE RECORD SHEET

To be prepared by each TSCO upon receipt of a TOP SECRET document.

DESCRIPTION	REGISTRY
SOURCE: London	ACCESSION NO. [illegible]
ADDRESSED TO: DCI	ACCESSION DATE: May 23
DOCUMENT DATE: May 23	OFFICE OR BRANCH: [illegible]
DOCUMENT NO.: 3938 COPY NO.: 1	LOGGED BY: [illegible]
NO. OF PAGES: 1 ATTACHMENTS: none	

INSTRUCTIONS:

The TSCO named below is responsible for the attached TOP SECRET document while it is charged to this Office or Branch. On receipt of this document from another TSCO he must prepare this form on which, according to TOP SECRET regulations, each person who sees the document or to whom its contents are communicated, must sign with the date and time received, and initial with the date and time of release in the spaces provided opposite his name. This document may be shown only to persons authorized to see TOP SECRET documents, and who are required to know the information which it contains. Each person formally charged with the safekeeping of this document by the TSCO in his Branch or Office is responsible for and must return the document to the TSCO before further routing.

The attached document was received from the _____ (Branch or Office), Courier Receipt No. _____

	REFERRED TO	RECEIVED			RELEASED		
	NAME	SIGNATURE	DATE	TIME	INITIALS	DATE	TIME
1.	TSCO	[signature]	5/23	1430	[signature]	5/23	1527
2.	[redacted]	[signature]	5/23	1527	[signature]	5/23	1540
3.	[redacted]				[signature]	5/24	
4.		[signature]	5/23	1450	[signature]	5/23	1455
5.		[signature]	5/23	1650	[signature]	5/23	1650
6.		[signature]	5/24	1600	[signature]		
7.		[signature]	5/24	910	[signature]	5/24	10
8.							
9.							
10.							
11.	TSCO						

When the last addressee concerned has read this document, the TSCO must sign on line 11, detach this sheet from the document and return it as a permanent record in the Branch. He must then deliver the document by Official Courier to the next TSCO named on the routing sheet attached to this document.

The attached document was released to the _____ (Branch or Office), Courier Receipt No. _____

TOP SECRET

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OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE 22 May 1945

TOP SECRET

FROM: Ustrovie London

TO: OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

DISTRIBUTION

PRIORITY
ROUTINE
DEFERRED

IN 13822

(FOR ACTION) DIRECTOR (1). Japan 16 sent

(FOR INFORMATION) Secret (2) Dept. (3) Navy (4)

RECEIVED IN CODE OR CIPHER

TOP SECRET

#2389. To Argus (#2539) from 109. Information 106 and Saint Washington. Referring to Saint #2399 (IN 13528) from Lisbon.

Argus has been given instructions concerning this matter. Although this operation may be carried out by Saint under the overall supervision of the Chief of Mission, communications are to be sent from the Chief of Mission to Director only, Washington.

TOP SECRET

FILE COPY

[illegible] 22 May 1945

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SIGNATURE RECORD SHEET

To be prepared by each TSCO upon receipt of a TOP SECRET document.

DESCRIPTION	REGISTRY
SOURCE: Dir.	ACCESSION NO.: OUT 12 060
ADDRESSED TO: London	ACCESSION DATE: May 21
DOCUMENT DATE: May 21	OFFICE OR BRANCH: Dir.
DOCUMENT NO.: 29 059 COPY NO.: 9	LOGGED BY: Jamison Jenkins
NO. OF PAGES: 1 ATTACHMENTS: None	

ATTENTION:

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The attached document was received from the _____ (branch or office), Courier Receipt No._____

	RELEASED TO	RECEIVED			RELEASED		
	NAME	SIGNATURE	DATE	TIME	INITIALS	DATE	TIME
1.	TSCO	[signature]	21 M	1645	RG	21 May	1650
2.		[signature]	5/22	1600	CJP	5/22	1700
3.		[signature]	5/22	1700	RCH	5/22	1730
4.							
5.							
6.							
7.							
8.							
9.							
10.							
11.	TSCO						

When all the officials concerned have read this document, the TSCO must sign on line 11, detach this sheet from the document and retain it as a permanent record in his files. He must then deliver the document by Officer Courier to the next TSCO listed on the cover letter that attached to this document.

The attached document was released by the _____ (branch or office), Courier Receipt No._____

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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/21 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100270005-0

DATE

REC'D 1323 21 May 1945

TO DONOVAN, LONDON

FROM OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

PRIORITY
ROUTINE
DEFERRED

OUT 120(A)

DISTRIBUTION

(INFORMATION TO ORIGINATOR)
DIRECTOR(1)

(FOR INFORMATION)

TRANSMITTED IN CODE OR CIPHER

TOP SECRET TOP SECRET

Number 109 from 106.

Assume you will want to take action on #2399(IN 13528) from Lisbon to London. We will not reply from Washington unless instructed by you to do so.

In this connection President has reemphasized that this country will consider nothing except absolute unconditional surrender.

TOP SECRET

FILE COPY

COPY 1

INITIALS OF "RELEASING" OFFICER

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

DATE 18 MAY 45 IN 13537

FROM CASERTA ITALY PRECEDENCE

TO OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES CLASSIFICATION SECRET

ACTION SI

INFORMATION DIRECTOR, SECRETARIAT, MACBRIDER, BIGELOW, FIELD SECTION, X-2.

RECEIVED IN CODE OR CIPHER

SECRET

FROM: MARROCK TO ESH AND HOUCK.

1. IN TALK WHICH GOW AND I HELD FEW DAYS AGO IN MILAN WITH JAPANESE DIPLOMATS FROM BERLIN WHOM WE ARE TURNING OVER TO PROPER AUTHORITIES, FOLLOWING POINTS DEVELOPED:

A. QUESTIONS REPEATEDLY ASKED US ON STATUS SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS, WITH EVIDENT DESIRE TO IMPRESS US THAT A REASONABLY STRONG JAPAN DESIRABLE AS BUFFER TO PROTECT AMERICA FROM SOVIET EXPANSION IN FAR EAST. VIEWS EXPRESSED THAT IF ONE JAPAN WERE UTTERLY CRUSHED, NATION MIGHT GO COMMUNIST. WE DID NOT DETECT MUCH CONVICTION IN LATTER SENTIMENT.

B. STRONG OPINION EXPRESSED THAT ONLY EMPEROR COULD MAKE PEACE. IF EMPEROR ISSUED ORDERS STOP FIGHTING 95 PERCENT WOULD OBEY INSTANTLY. WE POINTED OUT PRACTICAL IMPOSSIBILITY EMPEROR ACTING EXCEPT ON ADVICE MINISTERIAL ADVISORS AND COURT CIRCLES BUT THEY PERSISTED IN STATEMENT.

C. PERVERSE HOPE WAS EXPRESSED FOR "HONORABLE" PEACE TO ENSURE GOOD [illegible] RELATIONS IN FUTURE. WHEN I REMARKED THAT AN HONORABLE PEACE WAS A STRANGE THING TO ASK IN VIEW PEARL HARBOR, THEY HUNG THEIR HEADS IN SILENCE FOR FULL MINUTE. ELABORATING ON THEME, THEY SAID JAPS SHOULD

(CONTINUED ON PAGE TWO)

(T [illegible] THIS CABLE WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION FROM SECRETARIAT.

THE PENNY SECRET

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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/21 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100270005-0

DATE 13 MAY 43 IN 13537

FROM PRECEDENCE

TO CLASSIFICATION

ACTION
INFORMATION

(PAGE TWO------NR49064)

RECEIVED IN CODE OR CIPHER

SECRET

BE ALLOWED RETAIN HONSHU, FORMOSA, HOKKAIDO, KARAFUTO AND KURILE ISLANDS. MANCHUKUO COULD BE COMPLETELY INDEPENDENT. ALL CHINA TO BE EVACUATED. RIGHT OF FOREIGN TRADE FOR FUTURE CONSIDERED ESSENTIAL.

3. THEY CLAIMED THAT HAD HAD NO RECENT NEWS FROM JAPAN BUT WERE AWARE THAT DESTRUCTION HAD BEEN CONSIDERABLE, AND WOULD GET WORSE.

FILE COPY

SECRET

[redacted]

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PRINTED BY THE STANDARD REGISTER CO. DAYTON 1, OHIO U.S.A.

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old copies #1 & 2 destroyed in Mesage Center
" " #3,4,5, attached
new Murphy copy attached

Japan
16.8.41

Outside Edges of green card indicate the edges of the camera field

Exp. No. 11

Exposure is 1/25 @ f.6.3

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GSA FORM NO. 4066
5-61-NARS

TOP SECRET

SIGNATURE RECORD SHEET

To be prepared by each TSCO upon receipt of a TOP SECRET document.

DESCRIPTION	REGISTRY
SUBJECT: Lebanon	ACCESSION NO.: in 13525
ADDRESSED TO: K-2	ACCESSION DATE: May 21
DOCUMENT DATE: May 19	OFFICE OR BRANCH: Division
DOCUMENT NO.: 3249 COPY NO.: 2 Hand Copy	LOGGED BY: Frances Jenkins
NO. OF PAGES: 1 ATTACHMENTS: none	

ATTENTION:

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The attached document was received from the _____ (Branch or Office), Courier Receipt No. _____

	REFERRED TO	RECEIVED			RELEASED		
	NAME	SIGNATURE	DATE	TIME	INITIALS	DATE	TIME
2.	TSCO						
3.	[illegible]	[illegible] Edwin Burdon	5/21	1230	EAB	5/21	1245
4.							
5.							
6.							
7.							
8.							
9.							
10.							
11.	TSCO						

When all the officials concerned have read this document, the TSCO must sign on line 11, detach this cover from the document and retain it as a permanent record in the files. He must then deliver the document by Officer Courier to the next TSCO listed on the above routing sheet attached to this document.

The attached document was released to the _____ (Branch or Office), Courier Receipt No. _____

TOP SECRET

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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/21 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100270005-0

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE 19 May 1945

FROM LISSAN, LISBON

PRIORITY
ROUTINE
DEFERRED

TO OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

DISTRIBUTION

IN 13528

(FOR ACTION)	(FOR INFORMATION)
DIRECTOR(1)	MAGIUNIT(4) DOE ING(3)(5) MURPHY(2)

RECEIVED IN CODE OR CIPHER

TOP SECRET CONTROL

TOP SECRET

#2249. SAINT.

Action: Washington.
Information: London (#2399).
Re our #2199 to Washington (IN 12428), #2349 to London.

Inoue has repeated to BD-325 his desire to talk. Said terms of peace unimportant so long as expression "unconditional surrender" not employed. Japs convinced that in few weeks all wood paper houses will be destroyed but this will not bring unconditional surrender as fight will continue in China. Destruction of Meiji Jinja shrine has strengthened will to resist. Above passed to BD-567. No answer yet on previous message. Can you give me any answer for 325 to convey to Inoue?

TOP SECRET

TOR: 1533 19 May 45

Copy #2.

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SIGNATURE RECORD SHEET

To be prepared by each TSCO upon receipt of a TOP SECRET document

DESCRIPTION	REGISTRY
SOURCE: Lisbon	ACCESSION NO.: in 13528
ADDRESSED TO: E-2	ACCESSION DATE: May 21
DISCOVERY DATE: May 19	OFFICE OR BRANCH: Secretariat
DOCUMENT NO.: 2349 COPY NO.: 3	LOGGED BY: Frances Jenkins
NO. OF PAGES: 1 ATTACHMENTS: none	

ATTENTION:

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The attached document was received from the _____ (branch or office), Courier Receipt No. _____

	RECEIVED FROM		RECEIVED			RELEASED		
	NAME	SIGNATURE	DATE	TIME	INITIALS	DATE	TIME
1.	[illegible]	E J Putzell	5/21	1040	EJP	5/21	11:00
2.	[illegible]						
3.	[illegible]						
4.	[illegible]	R A Hallingsworth Jr	5/21	11:00	RAH	5/21	11:05
5.	[illegible]	N Mayert	5/21	1250	NM	5/21	1255
6.	[illegible]	R [illegible]	5/21	1205	RC	5/21	1211
7.							
8.							
9.							
10.							
11.	[illegible]						

When all the officials concerned have read this document, the TSCO must sign on the 1st dotted line, tear this form from the document and retain it as a permanent record in his files. He must then deliver the document by Officer Courier to the next [illegible] on the routing list attached to this document.

The attached document was released to the _____ (branch or office), Courier Receipt No. _____

TOP SECRET

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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/21 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100270005-0

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE 19 May 1945

FROM

LISSAN, LISBON

TO

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

PRIORITY
ROUTINE
DEFERRED

DISTRIBUTION

IN 13528

(FOR ACTION)

~~[illegible]~~ Director

(FOR INFORMATION)

~~[illegible]~~(2), DGE ING(3)(5)
MAGRUDER(4) Murphy

RECEIVED IN CODE OR CIPHER

TOP SECRET

CONTROL

TOP SECRET

#2249. SAINT.

Action: Washington.
Information: London (#2399).
Re our #2199 to Washington (IN 12428), #2349 to London.

Inoue has repeated to BD-325 his desire to talk. Said terms of peace unimportant so long as expression "unconditional surrender" not employed. Japs convinced that in few weeks all wood paper houses will be destroyed but this will not bring unconditional surrender as fight will continue in China. Destruction of Meiji Jinja shrine has strengthened will to resist. Above passed to BD-567. No answer yet on previous message. Can you give me any answer for 325 to convey to Inoue?

TOP SECRET

TOR: 1533 19 May 45

Copy #2

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ROUTING SHEET

To be prepared by the first TSCO who receives a TOP SECRET document.

DESCRIPTION	REGISTRY
SOURCE: Lisbon	ACCESSION NO.: DITS 829
ADDRESSED TO: OSS	
DOCUMENT DATE: 19 May 1945	ACCESSION DATE: 21 May 1945
DOCUMENT NO.: 2249 COPY NO. IN 13528	OFFICE OR BRANCH: DDIS
NO. OF PAGES: 1 ATTACHMENTS: None	LOGGED BY: R.Marris

ATTENTION:

The attached TOP SECRET document is hereby transferred into the temporary custody of the TOP SECRET CONTROL OFFICER listed below who is charged with full responsibility for this document until receipt is obtained from another TSCO. According to OSS TOP SECRET REGULATIONS, the first TSCO to receive a TOP SECRET document must execution it as-sig: TOP SECRET ACCESSION SHEET, OSS form 4063c and prepare all items in para 4. This form must remain attached to the document at all times to serve as a record of its movement between Offices or Branches within OSS. Each TSCO who receives or releases this document will sign below and add the date and time. It must be transmitted between TSCOs only by Officer Courier. Registered Receipts will be used.

	ADDRESSED TO	RECEIVED			RELEASED		
	BRANCH	SIGNATURE OF TSCO	DATE	TIME	INITIALS	DATE	TIME
1.	DDIS	[signature]	21 May	0920			
2.							
3.							
4.							
5.							
6.							
7.							
8.							
9.							
10.							
11.							
12.							

This sheet, together with the subject document, should be returned as soon as possible to

(SIGNATURE OF TSCO)

TOP SECRET

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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/21 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100270005-0

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE 19 May 1945

FROM LISSAN, LISBON

PRIORITY / ROUTINE / DEFERRED

TO OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

DISTRIBUTION

IN 13528

(FOR ACTION)	(FOR INFORMATION)
X-2(1)	DIRECTOR(2), DOE ING(3)(5) MAGUNT(4)

RECEIVED IN CODE OR CIPHER

TOP SECRET CONTROL

TOP SECRET

#2249. SAINT.

Action: Washington.
Information: London (#2399).
Re our #2199 to Washington (IN 12428), #2349 to London.

Inoue has repeated to BD-325 his desire to talk. Said terms of peace unimportant so long as expression "unconditional surrender" not employed. Japs convinced that in few weeks all wood paper houses will be destroyed but this will not bring unconditional surrender as fight will continue in China. Destruction of Meiji Jinja shrine has strengthened will to resist. Above passed to BD-567. No answer yet on previous message. Can you give me any answer for 325 to convey to Inoue?

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TOR: 1533 19 May 45

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DESCRIPTION	REGISTRY
SOURCE: Lisbon	ACCESSION NO.: [illegible] 13525
ADDRESSED TO: X-2	ACCESSION DATE: May 21
DOCUMENT DATE: May 19	OFFICE OR BRANCH: Secretariat
DOCUMENT NO.: 2249 COPY NO.: 5	LOGGED BY: Frances Jones
NO. OF PAGES: 1 ATTACHMENTS: none	

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE 19 May 1945

FROM LISFAN, LISBON

TO OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

PRIORITY
ROUTINE
DEFERRED

DISTRIBUTION

IN 13528

(FOR ACTION) (1) Director

(FOR INFORMATION) [redacted], DOE ING(3)(5)
MAGRUDER(4) Hemphill(2)

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#2249. SAINT.

Action: Washington.
Information: London (#2399).
Re our #2199 to Washington (IN 12428), #2349 to London.

Inoue has repeated to BD-325 his desire to talk. Said terms of peace unimportant so long as expression "unconditional surrender" not employed. Japs convinced that in few weeks all wood paper houses will be destroyed but this will not bring unconditional surrender as fight will continue in China. Destruction of Meiji Jinja shrine has strengthened will to resist. Above passed to BD-567. No answer yet on previous message. Can you give me any answer for 325 to convey to Inoue?

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ADDRESSED TO: Director	ACCESSION DATE: [illegible] 12
DOCUMENT DATE: [illegible] 11	OFFICE OR BRANCH: Director
DOCUMENT NO.: [illegible] COPY NO.: 1	LOGGED BY: [illegible]
NO. OF PAGES: 1 ATTACHMENTS: None	

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3.	[illegible]	[illegible]	5/12	1600	[illegible]	5/12	[illegible]
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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE 11 May 1945

TOP SECRET

FROM BERN, SWITZERLAND

TO OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

PRIORITY
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DEFERRED

DISTRIBUTION

IN 12800

FOR ACTION:

DIRECTOR(1)

FOR INFORMATION:

SECRETARIAT(2-3) MACRUDER(4)

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#10009. 109 from 110 and DR/OGI.

496, who has been in contact with Japanese here through 673, today reports talk between 673 and Kase, Jap Minister to Bern. 673 states Kase expressed wish to help in arranging for cessation of hostilities between Japs and Allies. Kase reportedly believes direct talks with Americans and British preferable to negotiations through Russia, as in latter event Russian prestige would so gain that all East would become Communistic. Kase certain that one of few Jap desiderata would be retention of Emperor because without him Japan would turn Communist. He feels that Grew, whom he considers best USA authority on Japan, shares this opinion.

10: 0136 12 May 1945

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6 Sept 45

6 September 1945

Mr. Robert P. Joyce
Office of Strategic Services
Mission to Switzerland
Bern, Switzerland

Dear Bob;

I wish to express my appreciation of your effective work in connection with the recent approaches from the Japanese group in Switzerland. The OSS takes pride in the manner in which you dealt with a most delicate matter. The fact that the channel which OSS Bern maintained was not used in the final negotiations does not detract from the value of the intelligence which that channel afforded. This information, reflecting with considerable accuracy the state of affairs in Tokyo, was welcome to those charged with United States policy decisions. It offered them additional indications of Japanese intentions and capabilities in their consideration of the basis for the termination of hostilities.

Will you please convey my thanks to Bob Shea and Paul Blum for their valuable assistance in the operations? Along with Allen Dulles, they and you should take great satisfaction in a signal contribution to the realization of peace.

William J. Donovan
Director

cc: Mr. Allen Dulles

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13 September 1945

General Donovan:

Attached for your signature are memoranda addressed to the President, the Secretary of State, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, based on a memorandum from Mr. Dulles concerning the Japanese pre-surrender attempt to approach Allied authorities through OSS representatives.

For General Megruder

C. T., Jr.
per SM

John Magruder, Brig. Gen.
Deputy Director, OSS -- Intelligence Service

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13 September 1945

Miss Rose Conway
The White House

Dear Miss Conway:

I believe the President will be interested in the enclosed memorandum, which is based on a report from Mr. Allan Dulles, Chief of the OSS Mission in Wiesbaden. Will you kindly see that it reaches his desk? Thank you.

Sincerely yours,

William J. Donovan
Director

Enclosure.

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13 September 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following, prepared to complete your records, is the substance of a final report, dated 27 August, from Mr. Allan Dulles, Chief of the OSS Mission in Wiesbaden, concerning the Japanese pre-surrender attempt to approach Allied authorities through OSS representatives. Previous memoranda describing these Japanese approaches were dated 13, 16 and 18 June, and 2, 9 and 14 August. The information summarized below was transmitted to Mr. Dulles on 17 and 20 August by Per Jacobsson, a Swedish national and economic advisor to the Bank for International Settlements, following the latter's further conversations with Kojiro Kitamura, director of the Bank for International Settlements and former Japanese financial attache in Berlin, and Yoshikazu Fujimura, a Japanese Navy representative. Jacobsson, Kitamura and Fujimura figured in the pre-surrender approaches in Switzerland.

On 17 August, Per Jacobsson transmitted the following information to Mr. Dulles:

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Brigadier General Kiyotomi Okamoto, believed to be head of Japanese intelligence in Europe until his suicide 15 August, received a telegram just before his death from the Japanese Chief of Staff, thanking him and his associates in Bern for their work in communicating with "the Americans" in Switzerland. The wire stated that their work in Switzerland had been most useful in enabling Tokyo to reach a decision.

(Mr. Dulles comments that the Navy and civilian groups were prepared to seek peace before the Army had come to such a decision. The initiation of formal peace offers therefore was blocked until someone in the Army group came out in favor of surrender.)

After receiving the message, General Okamoto wrote Fujimura asking him to express thanks to Jacobson and Mr. Dulles. In recognition of his work, Jacobson is to be entertained by both Fujimura and Hitomura. Jacobson feels that the Japanese in Bern must have been praised by Tokyo for their work.

In his messages to Tokyo prior to the Japanese surrender, General Okamoto had insisted that his government should deal solely with the United States. Jacobson believes it is

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likely that the suggestions of the Japanese in Bern "persuaded the Emperor finally to turn to the United States alone". The Swiss group, inspired by Jacobsson, suggested the face-saving formula that avoided the use of the word "surrender" in Japanese official communications.

Before he died, General Okamoto collected all of Fujimura's letters and other pertinent papers and directed that they be saved for historians' use. Jacobsson learned from Fujimura that immediately after General Okamoto's death, the Japanese Chief of Staff sent Okamoto's "military office" in Bern a message of condolence. The message apparently was not a mere formality, since it was much longer than customary and included the following sentence: "I appreciate his patriotic service rendered at our country's most critical moment." Fujimura and Kitamura regard this action as expressing approval and appreciation of the General's last telegrams advocating surrender.

Shunichi Kase, Japanese Minister in Bern, decided in July that he had been wrong in favoring the USSR as the intermediary for peace negotiations. He radioed Tokyo that the Soviet Union was not a satisfactory channel and that the wisest

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source would be to deal directly with the United States through Swiss contacts.

Jacobson believes that, because of the above, the Japanese Government elected to send the final surrender communication through Berne. Stockholm, he points out, would have served as well and would have been the normal transmittal point since the USSR, by then at war, had diplomatic representatives in the Swedish capital.

On 22 August, Per Jacobsson transmitted to Mr. Dulles the following additional comments by Kitamura and Fujimura:

The Japanese are worried about effecting the surrender of 2,500,000 unbeaten Japanese troops in Manchukuo, China and the South Pacific. The Emperor's full authority will be needed to bring about their surrender, and in surrendering to Chinese and Soviet forces, incidents may arise and Japanese troops, fearing torture, may refuse to disarm. The Japanese in Berne hope that General MacArthur will avert military chaos by personally supervising the surrenders in these areas. The Japanese hope for maximum American intervention here.

The two Japanese informants understand that Japanese

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funds and official archives in Bern are to be turned over to the United States. They both state emphatically that, contrary to "newspaper gossip", no large sums are held for Japanese account in Switzerland, and no gold whatsoever. They add that all Japanese accounts are blocked. (Jacobsson says he was told by President Weber of the National Bank that all Japanese funds in Switzerland were deposited with Weber's bank.) Kitamura's job in Bern has been to handle these funds, and he is prepared to give assurances that nothing will be concealed.

Fujimura and Kitamura wish to maintain the communication channel with Washington already established through Jacobsson and Mr. Dulles. They wish some American in Switzerland to be designated through whom informal communications could be channeled. They claim that such a link would enable Tokyo to get foreign views, as it did in the past, and that the Americans also might find it useful. Though they dislike the present Japanese Government, they realize that the presence of members of the royal family may be necessary to convince the Emperor's troops to accept surrender. Jacobsson believes that Kitamura's messages from Tokyo indicate his Government's wish to maintain such a channel. Jacobsson feels that this channel

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would enable the US to reach the most intransigeant Japanese elements. Kitamura and Fujimura fear that the Japanese Government will receive no objective comment except from Switzerland. Jacobsson adds, "What the Japanese hope to obtain through the United States is reasonable intervention with comprehension; their great fear is not that the United States will interfere but that it won't."

William J. Donovan
Director

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13 September 1945

MEMORANDUM OF INFORMATION
FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:

SUBJECT: Substance of Final Report Concerning Japanese Pre-Surrender Attempt to Approach Allied Authorities Through OSS Representatives.

The following, prepared to complete your records, is the substance of a final report, dated 27 August, from Mr. Allen Dulles, Chief of the OSS Mission in Wiesbaden, concerning the Japanese pre-surrender attempt to approach Allied authorities through OSS representatives. Previous memoranda describing these Japanese approaches were dated 13, 16 and 18 June, and 2, 8 and 14 August. The information summarized below was transmitted to Mr. Dulles on 17 and 20 August by Per Jacobsson, a Swedish national and economic adviser to the Bank for International Settlements, following the latter's further conversations with Kojiro Kitamura, director of the Bank for International Settlements, and former Japanese financial attache in Berlin, and Yosikazu Fujimura, a Japanese Navy representative. Jacobsson, Kitamura and Fujimura figured in the pre-surrender approaches in Switzerland.

On 17 August, Per Jacobsson transmitted the following information to Mr. Dulles:

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(Mr. Dulles comments that the Navy and civilian groups were prepared to seek peace before the Army had come to such a decision. The initiation of formal peace offers therefore was blocked until someone in the Army group came out in favor of surrender.)

After receiving the message, General Okamoto wrote Fujimura asking him to express thanks to Jacobsson and Mr. Dulles. In recognition of his work, Jacobsson is to be entertained by both Fujimura and Kitamura. Jacobsson feels that the Japanese in Bern must have been praised by Tokyo for their work.

In his messages to Tokyo prior to the Japanese surrender, General Okamoto had insisted that his Government should deal solely with the United States. Jacobsson believes it is likely that the suggestions of the Japanese in Bern "persuaded the Emperor finally to turn to the United States alone". The Swiss group, inspired by Jacobsson, suggested the face-saving formula that avoided the use of the word "surrender" in Japanese official communications.

Before he died, General Okamoto collected all of Fujimura's letters and other pertinent papers and directed that they be saved for historians' use. Jacobsson learned from Fujimura that immediately after General Okamoto's death, the Japanese Chief of Staff sent Okamoto's "military office" in Bern a message of condolence. The message apparently was not a mere formality, since it was much longer than customary and included the following sentence: "I appreciate his patriotic service rendered at our country's most critical moment." Fujimura and Kitamura regard this action as expressing approval and appreciation of the General's last telegrams advocating surrender.

Shunichi Kase, Japanese Minister in Bern, decided in July that he had been wrong in favoring the USSR as the intermediary for peace negotiations. He radioed Tokyo that the Soviet Union was not a satisfactory channel and that the wisest course would be to deal directly with the United States through Swiss contacts.

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Jacobsson believes that, because of the above, the Japanese Government elected to send the final surrender communication through Bern. Stockholm, he points out, would have served as well and would have been the normal transmittal point, since the USSR, by then at war, had diplomatic representatives in the Swedish capital.

On 20 August, Per Jacobsson transmitted to Mr. Dulles the following additional comments by Kitamura and Fujimura:

The Japanese are worried about effecting the surrender of 2,500,000 unbeaten Japanese troops in Manchukuo, China and the South Pacific. The Emperor's full authority will be needed to bring about their surrender, and in surrendering to Chinese and Soviet forces incidents may arise and Japanese troops, fearing torture, may refuse to disarm. The Japanese in Bern hope that General MacArthur will avert military chaos by personally supervising the surrenders in these areas. The Japanese hope for maximum American intervention here.

The two Japanese informants understand that Japanese funds and official archives in Bern are to be turned over to the United States. They both state emphatically that, contrary to "newspaper gossip", no large sums are held for Japanese account in Switzerland, and no gold whatsoever. They add that all Japanese accounts are blocked. (Jacobsson says he was told by President Weber of the National Bank that all Japanese funds in Switzerland were deposited with Weber's bank.) Kitamura's job in Bern has been to handle these funds, and he is prepared to give assurances that nothing will be concealed.

Fujimura and Kitamura wish to maintain the communication channel with Washington already established through Jacobsson and Mr. Dulles. They wish some American in Switzerland to be designated through whom informal communications could be channeled. They claim that such a link would enable Tokyo to get foreign views, as it did in the past, and that the Americans also might find it useful. Though they dislike the present Japanese Government, they realize that the presence of members of

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the royal family may be necessary to convince the unbeaten troops to accept surrender. Jacobsson believes that Kitamura's messages from Tokyo indicate his Government's wish to maintain such a channel. Jacobsson feels that this channel would enable the US to reach the most intransigent Japanese elements. Kitamura and Fujimura fear that the Japanese Government will receive no objective comment except from Switzerland. Jacobsson adds, "What the Japanese hope to obtain through the United States is reasonable intervention with comprehension; their great fear is not that the United States will interfere, but that it won't."

William J. Donovan
Director

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13 September 1945

Mr. Joseph W. Ballantine
Director
Division of Far Eastern Affairs
Department of State

Dear Mr. Ballantine:

The enclosed memorandum, based on a report from Mr. Allen Dulles, Chief of the OSS Mission in Wiesbaden, will probably be of interest to the Secretary. Will you be good enough to see that it reaches him? Thank you.

Sincerely yours,

William J. Donovan
Director

Enclosure.

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SECRET

13 September 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

The following, prepared to complete your records, is the substance of a final report, dated 27 August, from Mr. Allan Dulles, Chief of the OSS Mission in Wiesbaden, concerning the Japanese pre-surrender attempt to approach Allied authorities through OSS representatives. Previous memoranda describing these Japanese approaches were dated 13, 16 and 18 June, and 2, 8 and 14 August. The information summarized below was transmitted to Mr. Dulles on 17 and 21 August by Per Jacobsson, a Swedish national and economic adviser to the Bank for International Settlements, following the latter's further conversations with Kojiro Kitamura, director of the Bank for International Settlements and former Japanese financial attache in Berlin, and Yoshikami Fujimura, a Japanese Navy representative. Jacobsson, Kitamura and Fujimura figured in the pre-surrender approaches in Switzerland.

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Brigadier General Ziyotaki Okamoto, believed to be head of Japanese intelligence in Europe until his suicide 15 August, received a telegram just before his death from the Japanese Chief of Staff, thanking him and his associates in Bern for their work in communicating with "the Americans" in Switzerland. The wire stated that their work in Switzerland had been most useful in enabling Tokyo to reach a decision.

(Mr. Dulles comments that the Navy and civilian groups were prepared to seek peace before the Army had come to such a decision. The initiation of formal peace efforts therefore was blocked until someone in the Army group came out in favor of surrender.)

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After receiving the message, General Okamoto wrote Fujimura asking him to express thanks to Jacobsson and Mr. Dulles. In recognition of his work, Jacobsson is to be entertained by both Fujimura and Kitamura. Jacobsson feels that the Japanese in Bern must have been praised by Tokyo for their work.

In his messages to Tokyo prior to the Japanese surrender, General Okamoto had insisted that his Government should deal solely with the United States. Jacobsson believes it is likely that the suggestions of the Japanese in Bern "persuaded the Emperor finally to turn to the United States alone". The Swiss group, inspired by Jacobsson, suggested the face-saving formula that avoided the use of the word "surrender" in Japanese official communications.

Before he died, General Okamoto collected all of Fujimura's letters and other pertinent papers and directed that they be saved for historians' use. Jacobsson learned from Fujimura that immediately after General Okamoto's death, the Japanese Chief of Staff sent Okamoto's "military office" in Bern a message of condolence. The message apparently was not a mere formality, since it was much longer than customary and included the following sentence: "I appreciate his patriotic service rendered at our country's most critical moment." Fujimura and Kitamura regard this action as expressing approval and appreciation of the General's last telegram advocating surrender.

Minister Kase, Japanese Minister in Bern, decided in July that he had been wrong in favoring the USSR as the intermediary for peace negotiations. He radioed Tokyo that the Soviet Union was not a satisfactory channel and that the wisest course would be to deal directly with the United States through Swiss contacts.

Jacobsson believes that, because of the above, the Japanese Government elected to send the final surrender communication through Bern. Stockholm, he points out, would have served as well and would have been the normal transmittal point since the USSR, by then at war, had diplomatic representatives in the Swedish capital.

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On 20 August, Per Jacobsson transmitted to Mr. Dulles the following additional comments by Kitamura and Fujimura:

The Japanese are worried about effecting the surrender of 2,500,000 unbeaten Japanese troops in Manchukuo, China and the South Pacific. The Emperor's full authority will be needed to bring about their surrender, and in surrendering to Chinese and Soviet forces, incidents may arise and Japanese troops, fearing torture, may refuse to disarm. The Japanese in Bern hope that General MacArthur will avert military chaos by personally supervising the surrenders in these areas. The Japanese hope for maximum American intervention here.

The two Japanese informants understand that Japanese funds and official archives in Bern are to be turned over to the United States. They both state emphatically that, contrary to "newspaper gossip", no large sums are held for Japanese account in Switzerland, and no gold whatsoever. They add that all Japanese accounts are blocked. (Jacobsson says he was told by President Weber of the National Bank that all Japanese funds in Switzerland were deposited with Weber's bank.) Kitamura's job in Bern has been to handle these funds, and he is prepared to give assurances that nothing will be concealed.

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William J. Donovan
Director

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No person on the official concerned copy from this document has [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

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TOP SECRET

14 August 1945

Miss Rose Conway
The White House

Dear Miss Conway:

I believe that the attached report from our representative in Wiesbaden will be of interest to the President. Will you kindly see that it reaches his desk? Thank you.

Sincerely yours,

William J. Donovan
Director

Enclosure.

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TOP SECRET

13 August 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following is the substance of a message dated 13 August from Mr. Allen Dulles, Chief of the OSS Mission at Wiesbaden. The information contained in this message is a sequel to memoranda dated 13, 16, and 18, July and 2 and 9 August, concerning a Japanese attempt to approach Allied authorities through OSS representatives.

The Japanese official group in Switzerland is extremely angry at the USSR. It considers that the USSR knew by mid-July that Japan was willing to negotiate a surrender and used this to its own advantage. The group believes that the atomic bomb, not the Soviet entry into the war in the Pacific, caused the Japanese offer to surrender.

The official Japanese statement concerning the preservation of the Emperor's prerogatives is described as "clumsy" by the Japanese group. It declares that the phrase "Emperor's prerogatives" should have been translated "integrity" or "position", since Japan did not intend to give the impression that the Emperor's legal powers could not be altered. The group feels that a stipulation that the Emperor would not be considered a war criminal would have been sufficient.

William J. Donovan
Director

[redacted] #3849 (IN-21511) - 13 August

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TOP SECRET

14 August 1945

Honorable James C. Dunn
Assistant Secretary of State
Department of State

Dear Jimmy:

I believe that the attached report from our representative in Wiesbaden will be of interest to the Secretary. Will you kindly see that it reaches his desk? Thank you.

Sincerely yours,

William J. Donovan
Director

Enclosure.

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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/21 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100270005-0

TOP SECRET

14 August 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

The following is the substance of a message dated 13 August from Mr. Allen Dulles, Chief of the OSS Mission at Wiesbaden. The information contained in this message is a sequel to memoranda dated 13, 16, and 18, July and 7 and 9 August, concerning a Japanese attempt to approach Allied authorities through OSS representatives.

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William J. Donovan
Director

[redacted] Cable #3649 (IN-21/11) - 13 August.

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14 August 1945

MEMORANDUM OF INFORMATION
FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:

The following is the substance of a message dated 13 August from Mr. Allen Dulles, chief of the OSS Mission at Wiesbaden. The information contained in this message is a sequel to memoranda dated 13, 14, and 16, July and 2 and 9 August, concerning a Japanese attempt to approach Allied authorities through OSS representatives.

The Japanese official group in Switzerland is extremely angry at the USSR. It considers that the USSR knew by mid-July that Japan was willing to negotiate a surrender and used this to its own advantage. The group believes that the atomic bomb, not the Soviet entry into the war in the Pacific, caused the Japanese offer to surrender.

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William J. Donovan
Director

ARTHUR Cable #2849 (IN-21511), 13 August.

Not seen

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SIGNATURE RECORD SHEET

To be prepared by each TSCO upon receipt of a TOP SECRET document

DESCRIPTION	RECEIPT
SUBJECT: [redacted]	ACCESSION NO.: DOT 5 67
ADDRESSED TO: HAT Stats, Jes	ACCESSION DATE: 9 Aug 67
DOCUMENT DATE: 9 Aug 67	OFFICE OR BRANCH: Director
DOCUMENT NO.: [redacted] COPY NO.:	LOGGED BY: CPH
NO. OF PAGES: 4 of 9 ATTACHMENTS.	

ATTENTION:

The TSCO named below is responsible for the attached TOP SECRET document. It is charged to this Office or Branch. On receipt of this document from another TSCO, the person who must prepare this form on which, according to TOP SECRET regulations, each person who sees the document or to whom its contents are communicated, must sign his name, date and time received, and initial with the date and time of release in the space provided opposite his name. This document may be shown only to persons cleared for access to TOP SECRET documents, and who are required to know the information it contains. Each person formally charged with the safekeeping of this document by the TSCO in his Branch or Office is responsible for and must return the document to the TSCO before further routing.

The attached document was received from the _____ (branch or office), Courier Receipt No. _____

	DESIGNATED TO	RECEIVED			RELEASED		
	NAME	SIGNATURE	DATE	TIME	INITIALS	DATE	TIME
1.	TSCO						
2.		[redacted]	9/9	1410	CPH	9/9	1600
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12.	TSCO						

All persons to whom officials concerned have read this document, the TSCO will sign on the line marked TSCO, seal the document and retain it as a permanent record of this Office. He will then deliver the document by Officer Courier to the next addressee on the routing sheet appended to this document.

The attached document was released to the _____ (branch or office); Courier Receipt No. _____

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ROUTING SHEET

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9 August 1945

Miss Rose Conway
The White House

Dear Miss Conway:

Would you be good enough to place the attached report from Mr. Allen Dulles, Chief of the OSS mission in Wiesbaden, before the President? I believe it will interest him.

Sincerely yours,

John Magruder, Brig. Gen.
Acting Director

Enclosure.

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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/21 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100270005-0

TOP SECRET

9 August 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following is the substance of a message dated 8 August from Mr. Allen Dulles, Chief of the OSS mission in Wiesbaden. The information contained in this message is a sequel to memoranda dated 13, 16, and 18 July, and 2 August, concerning a Japanese attempt to approach Allied authorities through OSS representatives.

Per Jacobsson, a Swedish national and economic adviser to the Bank for International Settlements, has transmitted the following information to Mr. Dulles through an intermediary:

Kojiro Kitamura, director of the Bank for International Settlements and former financial attache in Berlin, has held a number of conversations on the significance of the tripartite ultimatum to Japan issued at Potsdam with the Japanese Minister in Bern, Shunichi Kase, and Brigadier General Kiyotomi Okamoto, believed to be the head of Japanese intelligence in Europe.

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According to indications from the Tokyo Radio, the three men all feel that the declaration initially was badly received. They emphasize, however, the "brief and perfunctory" nature of the formal reply as given over the Tokyo Radio by Premier Suzuki. They attribute the terseness of the reply as evidence of the influence of a "peace party".

This group in Switzerland has been sending daily cables to Tokyo stating that the Potsdam declaration to Japan was merely a simple statement of Allied war aims and not a "take-it-or-leave-it ultimatum which Japan could not honorably accept, as was first believed". The group feels that these daily messages to Tokyo have served to bolster the efforts of the "peace Party" in Tokyo. The group finds encouraging the fact that it has not been rebuked for such frank statements, and attaches considerable importance to a report in the Swiss press on 5 August that Foreign Minister Togo was received in private audience by the Emperor. The group considers that Togo belongs to "a new peace party".

The group requested Jacobsen to ask Mr. Dulles whether he would be willing to see an authorized representative of the Japanese Government. If so, one of the following would be selected as the representative: (1) Minister Hoso, acting as Japanese Government delegate to the conversations, not as Minister to Switzerland; (2) Ambassador Sato in

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Bucher; or preferably (3) some Swiss civilian now in Tokyo who could be sent under the cover of a representative of the International Red Cross. The group prefers the third alternative because it feels that such a person would know the situation in Tokyo and "would evaluate the situation as envisaged in Europe".

Mr. Dulles comments that there is no direct evidence that these suggestions from the Japanese group in Switzerland are based on instructions from Tokyo. Mr. Dulles has again cautioned Jacobson on this point and has emphasized to Jacobson that the only question is whether the Japanese are ready to accept unconditional surrender as set forth in the Potsdam and other previous official declarations. Realizing the extreme delicacy of this matter, Mr. Dulles continues to handle it with the greatest caution.

John Magruder, Brig. Gen.,
Acting Director

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9 August 1945

Honorable James C. Dunn
Assistant Secretary of State
Department of State
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Dunn:

I attach a memorandum on the matter I spoke to you about this afternoon.

Sincerely,

John Magruder, Brig. Gen.
Acting Director

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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/21 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100270005-0

9 August 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

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According to indications from the Tokyo Radio, the three men all feel that the declaration initially was badly received. They emphasize, however, the "brief and perfunctory" nature of the formal reply as given over the Tokyo Radio by Premier Suzuki. They attribute the terseness of the reply as evidence of the influence of a "peace party".

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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/21 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100270005-0

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John Magruder, Brig. Gen.
Acting Director

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9 August 1945

MEMORANDUM OF INFORMATION
FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:

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John Magruder, Brig. Gen.
Acting Director

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(Rev. 8-76/48)

SIGNATURE RECORD SHEET

To be prepared by each TSCO upon receipt of a TOP SECRET

DESCRIPTION	
SERIES: CSC	TSCO JOURNAL NO.: D[illegible] 441
ADDRESSED TO: RUT,JCS,Sec ST	
DOCUMENT DATE: 2 Aug 45	ACCESSION DATE: [illegible]
DOCUMENT NO.: 16 677 COPY NO.	OFFICE OF ORIGIN: [illegible]
NO. OF PAGES: [illegible] NO. OF ATTACHMENTS:	LOGGED BY: CFB

ATTENTION:

The TSCO named below is responsible for the utmost TOP SECRET [illegible] is charged to this Office or Branch. On receipt of this document [illegible] he must prepare this form on which, according to TOP SECRET regulations, [illegible] who sees the document or to whom its contents are communicated must [illegible] date and time received, and initial with the date and time [illegible] provided opposite his name. This document may be shown only to persons [illegible] to see TOP SECRET documents, and who are required to know the information [illegible] document. Each person formally charged with the safekeeping of [illegible] SECRET in his Branch or Office is responsible for and must personally [illegible] TSCO before further routing.

The attached document was received from the _____ (Branch or Office)

	REFERRED TO	RECEIVED				
	NAME	SIGNATURE	DAY	TIME	INITIAL	
1.	TSCO					
2.		Sec'y St	7th	1630	C L M	
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No [illegible] TOP SECRET concerned have read this document. The [illegible] [illegible] hereto must detach this sheet from the document and retain it as a permanent [illegible] [illegible] the next time the document is delivered by Officer Courier to [illegible] [illegible] to the Control Section. Next attached to this document.

The attached document was returned to the _____ Courier Route, No. _____ (Branch or Office)

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ROUTING SHEET

To be prepared by the first TSCO who receives a TOP SECRET document

REGISTRY
Accession No.: DOTS 844

ACCESSION DATE: 8/2/45
OFFICE OR BRANCH: Director's Office
LOGGED BY: CPH

Attachments:

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Received			Released		
By (Signature of TSCO)	DATE	TIME	INITIALS	DATE	TIME

Comment with the highest assurance, whether be returned as soon as

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2 August 1945

TOP SECRET

Miss Rose Conway
The White House

Dear Miss Conway:

I believe the President will be interested in the enclosed message from Mr. Allen Dulles, Chief of the OSS mission in Wiesbaden.

Sincerely yours,

Charles S. Cheston
Acting Director

Enclosure.

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2 August 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following is the substance of a message, dated 1 August, received from Mr. Allen Dulles, Chief of the OSS mission in Wiesbaden. The information contained in this message is a sequel to memoranda dated 13, 16 and 18 July concerning a Japanese attempt to approach Allied authorities through OSS representatives.

Immediately following is a summary of a report by Per Jacobsson, a Swedish national and economic adviser to the Bank for International Settlements, transmitted to Mr. Dulles through an intermediary:

The Japanese Chief of Staff has acknowledged without comment a long cable which Brigadier General Hiyotomi Okamoto sent from Switzerland on 19 July. Okamoto's telegram reportedly stated that Japan has lost the war and must promptly accept the consequences. Okamoto is believed to be the head of Japanese intelligence in Europe.

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The Japanese Foreign Minister has also acknowledged a detailed report from Shunichi Kase, Japanese Minister in Berne. Kase's report, sent on or about 21 July, included (a) Mr. Grew's statement of 10 July, (b) a memorandum from Kojiro Kitamura, director of the Bank for International Settlements and former financial attache in Berlin, who has been active in the current Japanese approaches to Mr. Dulles, and (c) a statement of Kase's own position. The Foreign Minister's reply to Kase's message contained the following query: "Is that all you have to say?" Kase interprets this query as an invitation to continue peace approaches.

The recent tripartite ultimatum to Japan has been the chief topic of discussion among Japanese groups in Switzerland. Their first reaction, on the basis of excerpts published in the Swiss press, was that (a) the proclamation showed a lack of understanding of Japanese character, (b) the document should have not been framed on a basis of "take it or leave it", (c) the inclusion of China as a signatory represented an "added element of humiliation", and (d) the document should have been sent through private channels rather than publicly. After receiving the full English text through Jacobsen, and after further study, the at-

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titude of the group changed, and the proclamation was accepted as an "astute document which left a possible way out". The group was particularly impressed by "unconditional surrender" in connection with the "Japanese armed forces" and to the reference to revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people. As a result, a telegram stressing these points was to be sent to Tokyo on 30 July.

The following is a summary of a memorandum to Mr. Dulles from the Japanese group in contact with Per Jacobsson. Jacobsson transmitted this memo along with his own report summarized above.

The Japanese group emphasizes that it is hoping for some decision within a week unless "resistance is too great". The Allies should not take "too seriously" what was said over the Tokyo radio about the tripartite proclamation. This radio comment was merely "propaganda to maintain morale in Japan". The real reply will be given through such "official channel", possibly by Minister Kase or General Okamoto, if an official Government reply is not made over the Tokyo radio.

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Mr. Dulles also has been informed, by a German authority on the Far East living in Switzerland who is one of his regular contacts, that Yoshimo Fujimura, a Japanese Navy representative in Bern, has sent seven long cables to his superiors in Tokyo during the past two months urging immediate cessation of hostilities. His superiors cabled in reply that the Japanese Navy no longer is able to "act alone", and instructed Fujimura not to take the initiative without orders from Tokyo, but to maintain his "most valuable contacts".

Fujimura, a former Japanese Assistant Naval Attache in Bern, reportedly has direct radio contact with the Navy Ministry and Navy Chief of Staff in Tokyo. To this same German source Fujimura previously had indicated an interest in the part Mr. Dulles played in arranging for the German capitulation in North Italy and in ascertaining what terms short of unconditional surrender might have been granted these Germans. He suggested that Japanese naval circles in Tokyo would be willing to surrender provided they were given assurances (a) that the Emperor would be retained and (b) if possible, that they could save some face from the present wreckage. Fujimura's approaches were the subject of memoranda dated 2 and 3 June.

The German source reports and Jacobsson confirms that Fujimura and Hibbard have established close contact with each other. The two men, Jacobsson affirms, are agreed that joint

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action by all Japanese services in Switzerland might make some impression on the Japanese Government, since Bern now "is probably next to Moscow the most important Japanese foreign post."

Charles S. Cheston
Acting Director

AMZON cables: #1129 (IN 19703) - 24 July
#2339 (IN 20419) - 1 August
#2349 (IN 20415) - 1 August

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2 August 1945

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MEMORANDUM OF INFORMATION
FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:

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typed at Navy Dept.

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The recent tripartite ultimatum to Japan has been the chief topic of discussion among Japanese groups in Switzerland. Their first reaction, on the basis of excerpts published in the Swiss press, was that (a) the proclamation showed a lack of understanding of Japanese character, (b) the document should have not been framed on a basis of "take it or leave it", (c) the inclusion of China as a signatory represented an "added element of humiliation", and (d) the document should have been sent through private channels rather than publicly. After receiving the full English text through Jacobson, and after further study, the attitude of the group changed, and the proclamation was accepted as an "astute document which left a possible way out". The group was particularly impressed by "unconditional surrender" in connection with the "Japanese armed forces" and to the reference to revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people. As a result, a telegram stressing these points was to be sent to Tokyo on 30 July.

The following is a summary of a memorandum to Mr. Dulles from the Japanese group in contact with Per Jacobsson. Jacobsson transmitted this memo along with his own report summarized above.

The Japanese group emphasizes that it is hoping for some decision within a week unless "resistance is too great". The Allies should not take "too seriously" what was said over the Tokyo radio about the tripartite proclamation. This radio comment was merely "propaganda to maintain morale in Japan". The real reply will be given through some "official channel", possibly by Minister Kase or General Okamoto, if an official Government reply is not made over the Tokyo radio.

Mr. Dulles also has been informed, by a German authority on the Far East living in Switzerland who is one of his regular contacts, that Yoshikuni Fujimura, a Japanese Navy representative in Rome, has sent seven long cables to his superiors in Tokyo during the past two months urging immediate cessation of

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hostilities. His superiors cabled in reply that the Japanese Navy no longer is able to "act alone", and instructed Fujimura not to take the initiative without orders from Tokyo, but to maintain his "most valuable contacts".

Fujimura, a former Japanese Assistant Naval Attache in Bern, reportedly has direct radio contact with the Navy Ministry and Navy Chief of Staff in Tokyo. To this same German source Fujimura previously had indicated an interest in the part which Mr. Dulles played in arranging for the German capitulation in North Italy and in ascertaining what terms short of unconditional surrender might have been granted these Germans. He suggested that Japanese naval circles in Tokyo would be willing to surrender provided they were given assurances (a) that the Emperor would be retained and (b) if possible, that they could save some face from the present wreckage. Fujimura's approaches were the subject of memoranda dated 2 and 4 June.

The German source reports and Jacobsson confirms that Fujimura and Kitamura have established close contact with each other. The two men, Jacobsson confirms, are agreed that joint action by all Japanese services in Switzerland might make some impression on the Japanese Government, since Bern now "is probably next to Moscow the most important Japanese foreign post."

Charles S. Cheston
Acting Director

[redacted] cables: [redacted] (IN 19703) - 24 July
[redacted] (IN 20419) - 1 August
[redacted] (IN 20415) - 1 August

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2 August 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

The following is the substance of a message, dated 1 August, received from Mr. Allen Dulles, Chief of the OSS mission in Wiesbaden. The information contained in this message is a sequel to memoranda dated 13, 16 and 18 July concerning a Japanese attempt to approach Allied authorities through OSS representatives.

Immediately following is a summary of a report by Per Jacobsson, a Swedish national and economic adviser to the Bank for International Settlements, transmitted to Mr. Dulles through an intermediary:

The Japanese Chief of Staff has acknowledged without comment a long cable which Brigadier General Kiyotomi Okamoto sent from Switzerland on 19 July. Okamoto's telegram reportedly stated that Japan has lost the war and must promptly accept the consequences. Okamoto is believed to be the head of Japanese Intelligence in Europe.

The Japanese Foreign Minister has also acknowledged a detailed report from Shunichi Kase, Japanese Minister in Bern. Kase's report, sent on or about 21 July, included (a) Mr. Grew's statement of 10 July, (b) a memorandum from Kojiro Kitamura, director of the Bank for International Settlements and former financial attache in Berlin, who has been active in the current Japanese approaches to Mr. Dulles, and (c) a statement of Kase's own position. The Foreign Minister's reply to Kase's message contained the following query: "Is that all you have to say?" Kase interprets this query as an invitation to continue peace approaches.

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The recent tripartite ultimatum to Japan has been the chief topic of discussion among Japanese groups in Switzerland. Their first reaction, on the basis of excerpts published in the Swiss press, was that (a) the proclamation showed a lack of understanding of Japanese character, (b) the document should have not been framed on a basis of "take it or leave it", (c) the inclusion of China as a signatory represented an "added element of humiliation", and (d) the document should have been sent through private channels rather than publicly. After receiving the full English text through Jacobsson, and after further study, the attitude of the group changed, and the proclamation was accepted as an "astute document which left a possible way out". The group was particularly impressed by "unconditional surrender" in connection with the Japanese armed forces" and to the reference to revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people. As a result, a telegram stressing these points was to be sent to Tokyo on 30 July.

The following is a summary of a memorandum to Mr. Dulles from the Japanese group in contact with Per Jacobsson. Jacobsson transmitted this memo along with his own report summarized above.

The Japanese group emphasizes that it is hoping for some decision within a week unless "resistance is too great". The Allies should not take "too seriously" what was said over the Tokyo radio about the tripartite proclamation. This radio comment was merely "propaganda to maintain morale in Japan". The real reply will be given through some "official channel", possibly by Minister Kase or General Okamoto, if an official Government reply is not made over the Tokyo radio.

Mr. Dulles also has been informed, by a German authority on the Far East living in Switzerland who is one of his regular contacts, that Isoshiro Fujimura, a Japanese Navy representative in Berne, has sent several long cables to his superiors in Tokyo during the past two months urging immediate cessation of hostilities.

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Fujimura, a former Japanese Assistant Naval Attache in Bern, reportedly has direct radio contact with the Navy Ministry and Navy Chief of Staff in Tokyo. To this same German source Fujimura previously had indicated an interest in the part which Mr. Dulles played in arranging for the German capitulation in North Italy and in ascertaining what terms short of unconditional surrender might have been granted these Germans. He suggested that Japanese naval circles in Tokyo would be willing to surrender provided they were given assurances (a) that the Emperor would be retained and (b) if possible, that they could save some face from the present wreckage. Fujimura's approaches were the subject of memoranda dated 2 and 4 June.

The German source reports and Jacobsson confirms that Fujimura and Kitamura have established close contact with each other. The two men, Jacobsson confirms, are agreed that joint action by all Japanese services in Switzerland might make some impression on the Japanese Government, since Bern now "is probably next to Moscow the most important Japanese foreign post."

Charles S. Cheston
Acting Director

AMZON cables: #1529 (IN 19703) - 24 July
#2039 (IN 20139) - 1 August
#2049 (IN 20135) - 1 August

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16,841

Japan

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DESCRIPTION	REGISTRY
SOURCE: JCD to B/Gen McFarland, JCS	ACCESSION NO.: DOTS 83[illegible]
ADDRESSED TO: Pres., Sec. State, &	
DOCUMENT DATE: 18 July 45	ACCESSION DATE: 18 July 45
DOCUMENT NO.: 16,841 COPY NO.:	OFFICE OR BRANCH: D.O.
NO. OF PAGES: 5 ATTACHMENTS:	LOGGED BY: MJS

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2.		[signature]	7/18	3:30	D.D.	[illegible]	[illegible]
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Number of Copies: 2	TSCO Att: WJB
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18 July 1945

Brig. Gen. A. J. McFarland
Secretary
Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff

Dear General McFarland:

The enclosed memorandum is a sequel to memoranda dated 13 and 16 July, concerning a Japanese attempt to approach Allied authorities through OSS representatives. The earlier memoranda have already been forwarded to you.

Enclosed also are two sealed envelopes, one addressed to the President and the other to the Secretary of State. I will appreciate your being kind enough to see that they reach the President and the Secretary of State at your earliest convenience.

Sincerely yours,

William J. Donovan
Director

Enclosures.

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18 July 1945

MEMORANDUM OF INFORMATION
FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:

SUBJECT: Possible Japanese Peace Feeler.

The following information, transmitted by Mr. Allen Dulles, Chief of the OSS mission in Wiesbaden, on 18 July, is a sequel to previous memoranda dated 13 and 16 July concerning a Japanese attempt to approach Allied authorities through OSS representatives:

Mr. Dulles has been informed by OSS representatives in Switzerland that Yoshimura and Kojiro Kitamura, Japanese officials in the Bank for International Settlements, were scheduled to confer at once with Brigadier General Kiyotomi Okamoto at Zurich, and immediately thereafter to cable Tokyo. Okamoto is a former Japanese military attache in Berne, now believed to be chief of Japanese Intelligence in Europe.

(Mr. Dulles believes that for the next few days important developments in this matter are not likely, but that a line is being opened which the Japanese may use when the situation in Tokyo permits Japan to accept unconditional surrender.)

William J. Donovan
Director

[redacted], Germany - #0849 (IN 19046) - 18 July 1945.

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18 July 1945

Honorable James F. Byrnes
Department of State

My dear Mr. Secretary:

The attached memorandum is a sequel to memoranda of 13 and 16 July concerning a Japanese attempt to approach Allied authorities through the OSS representatives. Copies of these memoranda have been delivered to the Acting Secretary of State.

Sincerely yours,

William J. Donovan
Director

Enclosure.

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18 July 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

The following information, transmitted by Mr. Allen Dulles, Chief of the OSS mission in Wiesbaden, on 18 July, is a sequel to previous memoranda dated 13 and 16 July concerning a Japanese attempt to approach Allied authorities through OSS representatives:

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(Mr. Dulles believes that for the next few days important developments in this matter are not likely, but that a line is being opened which the Japanese may use when the situation in Tokyo permits Japan to accept unconditional surrender.)

William J. Donovan
Director

[redacted], Germany - #0649 (IN 19046) - 18 July 1945.

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18 July 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following information, transmitted by Mr. Allen Dulles, Chief of the OSS mission in Wiesbaden, on 18 July, is a sequel to previous memoranda dated 13 and 16 July concerning a Japanese attempt to approach Allied authorities through OSS representatives:

Mr. Dulles has been informed by OSS representatives in Switzerland that Yoshimura and Kojiro Kitamura, Japanese officials in the Bank for International Settlements, were scheduled to confer at once with Brigadier General Kiyotomi Okamoto at Zurich, and immediately thereafter to cable Tokyo. Okamoto is a former Japanese military attache in Bern, now believed to be chief of Japanese Intelligence in Europe.

(Mr. Dulles believes that for the next few days important developments in this matter are not likely, but that a line is being opened which the Japanese may use when the situation in Tokyo permits Japan to accept unconditional surrender.)

William J. Donovan
Director

[redacted], Germany - #0849 (IN 19046) - 18 July 1945.

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SIGNATURE RECORD SHEET

To be prepared by each TSCO upon receipt of a TOP SECRET document

DESCRIPTION	REGISTRY
SOURCE: SWD & Sec. State ADDRESSEE: CG/Gen. McFarland, Prs. DOCUMENT DATE: 16 July 45 DOCUMENT NO.: 26,841 COPY NO.: NO. OF PAGES: 12 ATTACHMENTS:	ACCESSION NO.: DOTS 828 ACCESSION DATE: 17 July 45 OFFICE OR BRANCH: D.O. LOGGED BY: MJS

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[illegible]	[illegible]	7/17				
General Donovan		7/17	12:01	WJD	7/17	12:40

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16 July 1945

Brig. Gen. A. J. McFarland
Secretary
Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff

Dear General McFarland:

The attached memorandum is a sequel to a memorandum dated 13 July concerning a Japanese attempt to approach Allied authorities through OSS representatives. This matter is under the supervision of Mr. Allen Dulles, Chief of the OSS Mission in Wiesbaden. Mr. Dulles has been instructed that The Joint Chiefs of Staff may wish to establish direct contact with him in order to be apprised more promptly of any new developments. In such event it is requested that you communicate with Mr. Dulles and furnish him with such authority and facilities, including transport, as may be required.

Enclosed also are two sealed envelopes, one addressed to the President and the other to the Secretary of State. Would you be kind enough to see that they reach the President and Secretary of State at your earliest convenience?

Sincerely yours,

William J. Donovan
Director

Enclosures.

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16 July 1945

MEMORANDUM OF INFORMATION
FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:

SUBJECT: Possible Japanese Peace Feeler Through Official of Bank for International Settlements.

The following information, a sequel to a memorandum dated 13 July concerning a new Japanese attempt to approach Allied authorities through OSS representatives in Switzerland, has been received from Mr. Allen Dulles in Wiesbaden. The information was supplied by the source of the reference memorandum, Per Jacobsson, a Swedish national and economic advisor to the Bank for International Settlements in Basel. Jacobsson had asked to see Mr. Dulles and was brought to Wiesbaden for that purpose on 15 July, returning immediately to Basel.

Jacobsson reports that between 10 and 13 July he had a series of conferences with Yoshimura, a Japanese official attached to the Bank for International Settlements, and Kojiro Kitamura, a director of the Bank, representative of the Yokahama Specie Bank, and former financial attache in Berlin. Yoshimura and Kitamura claim to be acting in consultation with the Japanese Minister to Switzerland, Shunichi Kase, and Brigadier General Kiyotomi Okamoto, former Japanese military attache in Bern, who now is believed to be chief of Japanese Intelligence in Europe. Yoshimura and Kitamura claim further that Kase and Okamoto have direct and secret means of communicating with the Japanese Chief of Staff. Yoshimura also claims that the peace group which he represents includes General Umezu, Army Chief of Staff; Admiral Yonai, Minister of Navy; and Shigenori Togo, Foreign Minister.

Yoshimura and Kitamura appeared to Jacobsson no longer to question the principle of unconditional surrender, though at one point they asked whether unconditional military and naval

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surrender might not be sufficient. On his own initiative Jacobsson replied that such a proposal would not be acceptable to the Allies but would be considered merely a quibble. Both Japanese officials raised the question of maintaining Japanese territorial integrity, but they apparently did not mean to include Manchukuo, Korea or Formosa.

Throughout discussions with Jacobsson, the Japanese officials stressed only two points: (a) the preservation of the Emperor, and (b) the possibility of returning to the constitution promulgated in 1889. Kitamura prepared and presented to Jacobsson a memorandum asking him to sound out Mr. Dulles' opinion on the two points.

(Mr. Dulles feels that these two Japanese are insisting on the retention of the Emperor because they feel that he alone can take effective action with respect to surrender and that some hope of survival must be held out to him in order to gain his support for unconditional surrender.)

Letter Yoshimura and Kitamura prepared a second memorandum in which they asked how, if Tokyo were ready to proceed, conversations could be arranged with Allied representatives and what form of authorization would be required.

Jacobsson is personally convinced that these approaches are serious and that the Japanese group in Switzerland is in constant cable contact with Tokyo. This conviction appears to be based on impressions only, since his two Japanese contacts never stated precisely that they had received instructions from any authorized agency in Tokyo.

(Mr. Dulles, in carefully guarded statements, pointed out to Jacobsson that:

(1. Mr. Grew's statement of 10 July covered the situation. As yet these approaches which Jacobsson described, in the absence of conclusive evidence that they emanated from a fully-empowered official, fall squarely into the category of "peace feelers" described by Mr. Grew.

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(2. If competent Japanese authorities accepted unconditional surrender, appropriate Allied authorities would determine how such a surrender should be effected.

(3. He (Mr. Dulles) had no comments to make with regard to dynastic and constitutional questions.

(4. Prompt unconditional surrender appears to be the only way to save anything out of the wreckage.

(Mr. Dulles agrees with Jacobsson that the Japanese have taken to heart the consequences which Germany has suffered, including extensive physical destruction and the collapse of all German authority, because it prolonged a futile struggle many months after its hopelessness was wholly apparent. Jacobsson feels therefore that a tendency is growing in certain Japanese circles to try to terminate the war at any cost, provided that non-militaristic Japanese governmental institutions can be preserved in the Japanese home islands.

(Mr. Dulles expects within a few days to obtain some evidence as to whether these approaches by Yoshimura and Kitamura have any serious backing or represent merely an effort by the Japanese group in Switzerland to start something on their own initiative.)

William J. Donovan
Director

[redacted], Germany - 10409 (IN 18943) - 16 July 1945.

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16 July 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following information, a sequel to a memorandum dated 13 July concerning a new Japanese attempt to approach Allied authorities through OSS representatives in Switzerland, has been received from Mr. Allen Dulles in Wiesbaden. The information was supplied by the source of the reference memorandum, Per Jacobsson, a Swedish national and economic adviser to the Bank for International Settlements in Basel. Jacobsson had asked to see Mr. Dulles and was brought to Wiesbaden for that purpose on 15 July, returning immediately to Basel.

Jacobsson reports that between 10 and 13 July he had a series of conferences with Yoshimura, a Japanese official attached to the Bank for International Settlements, and Kojiro Kikumura, a director of the Bank, representative of the Yokohama Specie Bank, and former financial attache in Berlin. Yoshimura and Kikumura claim to be acting in consultation with the Japanese Minister to Switzerland, Shunichi Kase, and Brigadier General Yiichiro Onoda, former Japanese military attache in Bern, who now is believed to be chief of Japanese Intelligence in

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Europe. Yoshimura and Kitamura claim further that Kase and Okamoto have direct and secret means of communicating with the Japanese Chief of Staff. Yoshimura also claims that the peace group which he represents includes General Uchijiro Umezu, Army Chief of Staff; Admiral Mitsumasa Yonai, Minister of Navy; and Shigemori Togo, Foreign Minister.

Yoshimura and Kitamura appeared to Jacobsson no longer to question the principle of unconditional surrender, though at one point they asked whether unconditional military and naval surrender might not be sufficient. On his own initiative Jacobsson replied that such a proposal would not be acceptable to the Allies but would be considered merely a quibble. Both Japanese officials raised the question of maintaining Japanese territorial integrity, but they apparently did not mean to include Manchukuo, Korea or Formosa.

Throughout discussions with Jacobsson, the Japanese officials stressed only two points: (a) the preservation of the Emperor, and (b) the possibility of returning to the constitution promulgated in 1889. Kitamura prepared and presented to Jacobsson a memorandum asking him to sound out Mr. Dulles' opinion on the two points.

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(Mr. Dulles feels that these two Japanese are insisting on the retention of the Emperor because they feel that he alone can take effective action with respect to surrender and that some hope of survival must be held out to him in order to gain his support for unconditional surrender.)

Later Yoshimura and Kitamura prepared a second memorandum in which they asked how, if Tokyo were ready to proceed, conversations could be arranged with Allied representatives and what form of authorization would be required.

Jacobsen is personally convinced that these approaches are serious and that the Japanese group in Switzerland is in constant cable contact with Tokyo. This conviction appears to be based on impressions only, since his two Japanese contacts never stated previously that they had received instructions from any authorized agency in Tokyo.

Mr. Dulles, in carefully guarded statements, pointed out to Jacobsen that:

(1. Mr. Grew's statement of 10 July covered the situation. As yet these approaches which Jacobsen described, in the absence of cumulative evidence that they emanated from a fully-empowered official, fall squarely into the category of "peace feelers" described by Mr. Grew.

(2. If competent Japanese authorities accepted unconditional surrender, appropriate Allied authorities would determine how such a surrender should be effected.

(3. He (Mr. Dulles) had no comments to make with regard to domestic and constitutional questions.

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(Mr. Dulles expects within a few days to obtain some evidence as to whether these approaches by Yoshimura and Kibayashi have any serious backing or represent merely an effort by the Japanese group in Switzerland to start something on their own initiative.)

William J. Donovan
Director

[redacted], Germany - #0609 (IN 18843) - 16 July 1945.

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16 July 1945

Honorable James F. Byrnes
Secretary of State

My dear Mr. Secretary:

The attached memorandum is a sequel to a memorandum of 13 July concerning a Japanese attempt to approach Allied authorities through the OSS representatives. Copies of both memoranda have been delivered to the Acting Secretary of State.

Sincerely yours,

William J. Donovan
Director

Enclosure.

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16 July 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

The following information, a sequel to a memorandum dated 13 July concerning a new Japanese attempt to approach Allied authorities through OSS representatives in Switzerland, has been received from Mr. Allen Dulles in Wiesbaden. The informant was supplied by the source of the reference memorandum, Per Jacobsson, a Swedish national and economic adviser to the Bank for International Settlements in Basel. Jacobsson had asked to see Mr. Dulles and was brought to Wiesbaden for that purpose on 15 July, returning immediately to Basel.

Jacobsson reports that between 10 and 13 July he had a series of conferences with Yoshimura, a Japanese official attached to the Bank for International Settlements, and Kojiro Kitamura, a director of the Bank, representative of the Yokohama Specie Bank, and former financial attache in Berlin. Yoshimura and Kitamura claim to be acting in consultation with the Japanese Minister to Switzerland, Shunichi Kase, and Brigadier General Eiyotaro Okamoto, former Japanese military attache in Berlin, who now is believed to be chief of Japanese Intelligence in Europe. Yoshimura and Kitamura claim further that Kase and Okamoto have direct and secret means of communicating with the Japanese Chief of Staff. Yoshimura also claims that the peace group which he represents includes General Wehijiro Umezu, Army Chief of Staff; Admiral Mitsumasa Yonai, Minister of Navy; and Shigenori Togo, Foreign Minister.

Yoshimura and Kitamura appeared to Jacobsson no longer to question the principle of unconditional surrender, though at one point they made further unconditional military and naval surrender might be sufficient. On his own initiative, Jacobsson said that such a proposal would not be acceptable to the Allies but would be considered merely a quibble. Both Japanese officials refused the question of maintaining Japanese sovereignty, but they apparently did not mean to in-

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Throughout discussions with Jacobson, the Japanese officials stressed only two points: (a) the preservation of the Emperor, and (b) the possibility of returning to the constitution promulgated in 1889. Kitamura prepared and presented to Jacobson a memorandum asking him to sound out Mr. Dulles' opinion on the two points.

(Mr. Dulles feels that these two Japanese are insisting on the retention of the Emperor because they feel that he alone can take effective action with respect to surrender and that some hope of survival must be held out to him in order to gain his support for unconditional surrender.)

Later Yoshimura and Kitamura prepared a second memorandum in which they asked how, if Tokyo were ready to proceed, conversations could be arranged with Allied representatives and what form of authorization would be required.

Jacobson is personally convinced that these approaches are serious and that the Japanese group in Switzerland is in earnest and that [illegible] contact with Tokyo. This conviction appears to be based on impressions only, since the two Japanese contacts gave Allied [illegible] that they had received instructions from any authorized group in Tokyo.

(Mr. Dulles, in carefully guarded statements, pointed out to Jacobson that:

(1. Mr. Grew's statement of 10 July covered the situation. As yet there appeared [illegible] which Jacobson described, in the absence of cumulative evidence that they emanated from a fully-empowered official, fall entirely into the category of "peace feelers" described by Mr. Grew.

(2. If competent Japanese authorities accepted unconditional surrender, appropriate Allied authorities would [illegible] how such a surrender should be effected.

(3. As Mr. Dulles) had no comments to make with regard to [illegible] unconditional questions.

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(4. Prompt unconditional surrender appears to be the only way to save anything out of the wreckage.

(Mr. Dulles agrees with Jacobsen that the Japanese have taken to heart the consequences which Germany has suffered, including extensive physical destruction and the collapse of all German authority, because it prolonged a futile struggle many months after its hopelessness was wholly apparent. Jacobsen feels therefore that a tendency is growing in certain Japanese circles to try to terminate the war at any cost, provided that ultra-militaristic Japanese governmental institutions can be preserved in the Japanese home islands.

(Mr. Dulles expects within a few days to obtain some evidence as to whether these approaches by Yoshimura and Kitazawa have any serious backing or represent merely an effort by the Japanese group in Switzerland to start something on their own initiative.)

William J. Donovan
Director

BERLIN, Germany - #0609 (IN 10443) - 16 July 1945.

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OSS FORM NO. 4066
(Rev. 12/44)

TOP SECRET

SIGNATURE RECORD SHEET

To be prepared by each TSCO upon receipt of a TOP SECRET document

DESCRIPTION	
SOURCE:	Cheston
ADDRESSED TO:	Pres. JCS, State
DOCUMENT DATE:	13 July 45
DOCUMENT NO.:	16,841 COPY NO.:
NO. OF PAGES:	8 ATTACHMENTS:

REC'D STAT
ACCESSION NO. 2023 825

ACCESSION DATE: 13 July 45
OFFICE OR BRANCH: ...O.
LOGGED BY: JS

ATTENTION:

The TSCO named below is responsible for the attached TOP SECRET document while it is charged to this Office or Branch. On receipt of this document from another TSCO he must prepare this form on which, according to TOP SECRET regulations, each person who sees the document or to whom its contents are communicated, must sign with the date and time received, and initial with the date and time of release in the spaces provided opposite his name. This document may be shown only to persons authorized to see TOP SECRET documents, and who are required to know the information contained. Each person formally charged with the safekeeping of this document by TSCO in his Branch or Office is responsible for and must return the document to TSCO before further routing.

The attached document was received from the [branch or office]; Courier Receipt No.____

	REFERRED TO	RECEIVED			RELEASED		
	NAME	SIGNATURE	DATE	TIME	INITIALS	DATE	TIME
1.	TSCO						
2.		[signature]	7/15	3.30	[illegible]	7/15	[illegible]
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11.							
12.	TSCO						

After all the officials concerned have read this document, the TSCO must sign on line No. 12 above, take sheet from the document and retain it as a permanent record in his files. He must then deliver the document by Officer Courier to the next TSCO on the routing list, stamped to this document.

The attached document was released to the [branch or office]; Courier Receipt No.____

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ROUTING SHEET

...be released by the first ESCO who receives a TOP SECRET ...

...: Chrome	REGISTRY
...: ...Jon, Ficsh	Accession No. DOIB 829
...: ...	Accession Date: 19 July 45
...: ...	Office or Branch: D.O.
...: ...	Signed By: MJS

...

...ached TOP SECRET document is hereby transferred into the temporary ... the TOP SECRET Control Officer listed below, who is charged with full ... this document until receipt is obtained from another ESCO. ... the SECRET REGULATIONS the first ESCO to receive a TOP SECRET ... such reception is to be the TOP SECRET ACCESSION SHEET, OSS Form 40832 and prepa... In case this routing sheet must remain attached to the document ... ESCO who receives or releases this document will sign below and ... the time. It must be transmitted between ESCOs only by Officer Courier. ...

...ferred to	Received			Released		
Name	Signature	Date	Time	Initials	Date	Time

...with the material ... should be returned to ESCO ...

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TOP SECRET

13 July 1945

Brigadier General A. J. McFarland
Secretary, Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff

Dear General McFarland:

I hasten to forward the enclosed report from Mr. Allen Dulles in Wiesbaden which will, we believe, be of interest to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

I am also taking the liberty of enclosing a sealed envelope to the President and ask that you be good enough to have it delivered to him for his personal inspection at the earliest possible moment.

Sincerely yours,

Charles S. Cheston
Acting Director

Enclosure

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TOP SECRET

13 July 1945

MEMORANDUM OF INFORMATION
FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:

SUBJECT: Japan - Possible Japanese Peace Feeler Through Official of Bank for International Settlements.

The following information, received from Mr. Allen Dulles in Bienbohm, dated 12 and 13 July, concerns a new Japanese attempt to approach Allied authorities through OSS representatives in Switzerland:

Per Jacobsen, a Swedish national and economic adviser to the Bank for International Settlements, has been approached by Eiichi Kitamura, a director of the Bank, a representative of the Yokohama Specie Bank and former financial attache in Berlin. Kitamura indicated to Jacobsen that he was anxious to establish immediate contact with American representatives and implied that the only condition on which Japan would insist with respect to surrender would be some consideration for the Japanese Imperial family. Kitamura showed that he was completely familiar with OSS operations which led to the surrender of German forces in North Italy, and declared that he wished to establish a contact similar to that made by General Karl Wolff.

According to Jacobsen, Kitamura is acting with the consent of the Japanese Minister to Switzerland, Shunichi Kase, and is working with Brigadier General Kiyotomi Okamoto, a former Japanese Military Attache in Rome. Okamoto is probably the chief of Japanese intelligence in Europe. Kitamura claims that the Japanese Legation in Switzerland has direct communications with Tokyo and is in a position to make definite commitments.

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(Responsible OSS out-ant sources who talked with Jacobson at Basel believe that the Kitamura approach was initiated locally rather than on the basis of instructions from Tokyo. Hence it is difficult to assess the seriousness of the approach.

(The OSS representative in Bern reports that Jacobson has urgently requested him to come to Basel to see him this coming week-end. The OSS representative has declined the invitation but has told Jacobson that he could see him in Bern on Sunday, 15 July. The OSS representative in Bern will see Jacobson only to obtain such intelligence as Jacobson is able to give, and expects to treat the entire matter with the greatest caution and reserve.)

Charles S. Cheston
Acting Director

[redacted] Cables #0459 (7/12) and #0459 (7/13).

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13 July 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following information, received from Mr. Allen Dulles in Wiesbaden, dated 12 and 13 July, concerns a new Japanese attempt to approach Allied authorities through OSS representatives in Switzerland:

Per Jacobsen, a Swedish national and economic adviser to the Bank for International Settlements, has been approached by Kojiro Kitamura, a director of the Bank, a representative of the Yokohama Specie Bank and former financial attache in Berlin. Kitamura indicated to Jacobsen that he was anxious to establish immediate contact with American representatives and implied that the only condition on which Japan would insist with respect to surrender would be some consideration for the Japanese Imperial family. Kitamura showed that he was completely familiar with OSS operations which led to the surrender of the German forces in North Italy, and declared that he wished to establish a contact similar to that made by General Karl Wolff.

According to Jacobsen, Kitamura is acting with the consent of the Japanese Minister to Switzerland, Shunichi Kase, and

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in meeting with Brigadier General Kiyotomi Okamoto, a former Japanese Military Attache in Bern. [Okamoto is probably the chief of Japanese Intelligence in Europe.] Kitamura claims that the Japanese group in Switzerland has direct communications with Tokyo and is in a position to make definite commitments.

(Responsible OSS out-out sources who talked with Jacobson at Basel believe that the Kitamura approach was initiated locally rather than on the basis of instructions from Tokyo. Hence it is difficult to assess the seriousness of the approach.

(The OSS representative in Bern reports that Jacobson has urgently requested him to come to Basel to see him this coming week-end. The OSS representative has declined the invitation but has told Jacobson that he could see him in Bern on Monday, 19 July. The OSS representative in Bern will see Jacobson only to obtain such intelligence as Jacobson is able to give, and expects to treat the entire matter with the greatest caution and reserve.)

Charles S. Cheston
Acting Director

[illegible] Cables 80459 (7/12) and 80459 (7/13).

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13 July 1945

Honorable James C. Dunn
Assistant Secretary of State
Department of State

Dear Mr. Dunn:

I believe the Secretary will be interested in the attached report from Mr. Allen Dulles in Wiesbaden.

Sincerely yours,

Charles S. Cheston
Acting Director

Enclosure.

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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/21 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100270005-0

TOP SECRET

13 July 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

The following information, received from Mr. Allen Dulles in Stockholm, dated 12 and 13 July, concerns a new Japanese attempt to approach Allied authorities through OSS representatives in Switzerland:

Per Jacobsen, a Swedish national and economic adviser to the Bank for International Settlements, has been approached by Eiichi Kitamura, a director of the Bank, a representative of the Yokohama Specie Bank and former financial attache in Berlin. Kitamura indicated to Jacobsen that he was anxious to establish immediate contact with American representatives and implied that the only condition on which Japan would insist with respect to surrender would be some consideration for the Japanese Imperial family. Kitamura showed that he was completely familiar with OSS operations which led to the surrender of German forces in North Italy, and declared that he wished to establish a contact similar to that made by General Lyon Selby.

According to Jacobsen, Kitamura is acting with the consent of the Japanese Minister to Switzerland, Shunichi Kase, and is working with Brigadier General Kiyotomi Okazaki, a former Japanese Military Attache in Bern. Okazaki is probably the chief of Japanese intelligence in Europe. Kitamura claims that the Japanese group in Switzerland has direct communications with Tokyo and is in a position to make definite commitments.

Responsible OSS end-out sources who talked with Jacobsen in Basel believe that the Kitamura approach was initiated locally rather than on the basis of instructions from Tokyo. Hence it is difficult to assess the seriousness of the approach.

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(The OSS representative in Bern reports that Jacobson has urgently requested him to come to Basel to see him this coming week-end. The OSS representative has declined the invitation but has told Jacobson that he could see him in Bern on Sunday, 15 July. The OSS representative in Bern will see Jacobson only to obtain such intelligence as Jacobson is able to give, and expects to treat the entire matter with the greatest caution and reserve.)

Charles S. Cheston
Acting Director

[redacted] Cables #0409 (7/12) and #0459 (7/13).

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OSS FORM NO. 2006
(REV. 1/6/42)

TOP SECRET CONTROL

SIGNATURE RECORD SHEET

To be prepared by each TSCO upon receipt of a TOP SECRET document.

DESCRIPTION	REGISTRY
SOURCE: Director, State, JCS	ACCESSION NO.: DoTS 779
ADDRESSED TO: Dir, State, JCS	ACCESSION DATE: 22 June 45
DOCUMENT DATE: 22 June	OFFICE OR BRANCH: Director
DOCUMENT NO.: 16,341 COPY NO.:	LOGGED BY: CPH
NO. OF PAGES: 5 ATTACHMENTS: 1 Memo 6/22	

ATTENTION:
The TSCO named below is responsible for the attached TOP SECRET document while it is charged to this Office or Branch. On receipt of this document from another TSCO he must prepare this form on which, according to TOP SECRET regulations, each person who sees the document or to whom its contents are communicated, must sign with the date and time received, and initial with the date and time of release in the spaces provided opposite his name. This document may be shown only to persons authorized to see TOP SECRET documents, and who are required to know the information which it contains. Each person formally charged with the safekeeping of this document by the TSCO in his Branch or Office is responsible for and must return the document to the TSCO before further routing.

The attached document was received from the _____ (branch or office), Courier Receipt No._____

	REFERRED TO	RECEIVED			RELEASED		
	NAME	SIGNATURE	DATE	TIME	INITIALS	DATE	TIME
1.	TSCO						
2.		R Hesbit	6/22	1535	CPH	6/22	1545
3.		[illegible]	6/22	15:45	CLOD	6/22	16:00
4.							
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9.							
10.							
11.	TSCO						

As soon as the officials concerned have read this document, the TSCO must sign on line 11, detach this sheet from the document and retain it as a permanent record in his files. He must then deliver the document by Officer Courier to the next TSCO listed on the routing sheet attached to this document.

The attached document was released to the _____ (branch or office), Courier Receipt No._____

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(OVER)

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ROUTING SHEET

To be prepared by the first TSCO who receives a TOP SECRET document.

DESCRIPTION	RECEIPT
COPY NO.:	ACCESSION NO.: DCS 797
ATTACHMENTS:	ACCESSION DATE: 22 December 45
	OFFICE OR BRANCH: Dir Central Files
	LOGGED BY:

REFERENCE:

The referenced TOP SECRET document is hereby transferred into the temporary custody of the TOP SECRET CONTROL OFFICER listed below who is charged with full responsibility for this document until receipt can be obtained from another TSCO. According to new TOP SECRET REGULATIONS, the first TSCO to receive a TOP SECRET document will prepare one additional (1) OSS TOP SECRET ACCESSION SHEET, OSS Form 4063. and prepare one copy, this routing sheet. This form will remain attached to the document at all times to serve as a record of its movement between Offices or Branches within OSS. Each TSCO who receives or releases this document will sign below and add the date and time. It must be transmitted between TSCOs only by Officer Courier. Any other method of receipt will be used.

RELEASED TO		RECEIVED		RELEASED		
Office	Signature of TSCO	Date	Time	Initials	Date	Time

When completely executed, this routing sheet should be returned to CSDOC as soon as

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CONTROL

TOP SECRET

22 June 1945

Colonel Buxton:

Attached for your signature are memoranda addressed to the President, the Secretary of State, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff -- sequel to previous memoranda concerning alleged Japanese peace feelers.

Bern Cable #11-57, of 21 June.

For General Magruder

C. T., Jr.

per ltr

John Magruder, Brig. Gen.
Deputy Director, OSS -- Intelligence Service

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Exposure is 1/25 @ f. 6.3

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TOP SECRET

CONTROL

22 June 1945

Miss Rose Conway
The White House

Dear Miss Conway:

I believe the President will be interested in the enclosed message from our representative in Bern.

Sincerely yours,

C. Edward Buxton
Acting Director

Enclosure.

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CONTROL

22 June 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following information, transmitted by the OSS representative in Bern, is a sequel to memoranda dated 12 May and 4 June concerning peace feelers emanating reportedly from the Japanese Legation in Bern. The source of the information is the same German authority referred to in previous memoranda, a description of whom is appended below:

According to source, Fujimura insists that the Japanese, before surrendering, would require assurances that the Emperor would be retained. Fujimura has read accounts in the Bern press of Mr. Allen Dulles' part in arranging for the German capitulation in North Italy. Fujimura is obviously interested in knowing what terms short of unconditional surrender might have been granted these Germans.

Fujimura, a former Japanese Assistant Naval Attache in Berlin, is considered to be one of the principal Japanese naval representatives in Europe. From Bern he is reportedly in close touch by cable

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with naval circles in Tokyo.]

[Source is a German national who was taken prisoner by the Japanese in World War I. Upon his release he remained in Japan and established important commercial relations there. He placed Japanese purchases in Germany, made a substantial fortune, and gained the confidence of high Japanese circles, particularly in the Navy. Some years ago he returned to Europe and, as he was persona non grata with the Hitler Government, took up residence in Zurich. He maintained contacts, however, with Japanese circles in Berlin, particularly with Admiral Nomura, the Japanese Naval Attache. He is understood to have advised the Japanese two years ago that Germany would be decisively defeated, while Ambassador Oshima at that time officially predicted a German victory.]

G. Edward Buxton
Acting Director

Bern Cable #11057 (IN 16633) - 21 June 1945.

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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/21 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100270005-0

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CONTROL

22 June 1945

Honorable James C. Dunn
Assistant Secretary of State
Department of State

Dear Mr. Dunn:

I think the Secretary will be interested in the attached report from the OSS representative in Bern.

Sincerely yours,

G. Edward Buxton
Acting Director

Enclosure.

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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/21 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100270005-0

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22 June 1945

CONTROL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

The following information, transmitted by the OSS representative in Bern, is a sequel to memoranda dated 12 May and 4 June concerning peace feelers emanating reportedly from the Japanese Legation in Bern. The source of the information is the same German authority referred to in previous memoranda, a description of whom is appended below:

According to source, Fujimura insists that the Japanese, before surrendering, would require assurances that the Emperor would be retained. Fujimura has read accounts in the Bern press of Mr. Allen Dulles' part in arranging for the German capitulation in North Italy. Fujimura is obviously interested in knowing what terms short of unconditional surrender might have been granted these Germans.

Fujimura, a former Japanese Assistant Naval Attache in Berlin, is considered to be one of the principal Japanese naval representatives in Europe. From Bern he is reportedly in close touch by cable with naval circles in Tokyo.

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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/21 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100270005-0

Source is a German national who was taken prisoner by the Japanese in World War I. Upon his release he remained in Japan and established important commercial relations there. He placed Japanese purchases in Germany, made a substantial fortune, and gained the confidence of high Japanese circles, particularly in the Navy. Some years ago he returned to Europe, and, as he was persona non grata with the Hitler Government, he took up residence in Zurich. He maintained contacts, however, with Japanese circles in Berlin, especially with Admiral Nomura, the Japanese Naval Attache. He is understood to have advised the Japanese two years ago that Germany would be decisively defeated, while Ambassador Oshima at that time officially predicted a German victory.

G. Edward Buxton
Acting Director

Bern Cable #11057 (IN 16633) - 21 June 1945.

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TOP SECRET
CONTROL

22 June 1945

MEMORANDUM OF INFORMATION
FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:

SUBJECT: Alleged Japanese Peace Feelers.

The following information, transmitted by the OSS representative in Bern, is a sequel to memoranda dated 12 May and 4 June concerning peace feelers emanating reportedly from the Japanese Legation in Bern. The source of the information is the same German authority referred to in previous memoranda, a description of whom is appended below:

According to source, Fujimura insists that the Japanese, before surrendering, would require assurances that the Emperor would be retained. Fujimura has read accounts in the Bern press of Mr. Allen Dulles' part in arranging for the German capitulation in North Italy. Fujimura is obviously interested in knowing what terms short of unconditional surrender might have been granted these Germans.

Fujimura, a former Japanese Assistant Naval Attache in Berlin, is considered to be one of the principal Japanese naval representatives in Europe. From Bern he is reportedly in close touch by cable with naval circles in Tokyo.

Source is a German national who was taken prisoner by the Japanese in World War I. Upon his release he remained in Japan and established important commercial relations there. He placed Japanese purchases in Germany, made a substantial fortune, and gained the confidence of high Japanese circles, particularly in the Navy. Some years ago he returned to Europe, and, as he was strongly anti-Nazi with the Hitler Government, took up residence in Zurich. He maintained contacts, however, with Japanese circles in Berlin, especially with Admiral Nomura, the Japanese Naval Attache. He is understood to have advised the Japanese two years ago that Germany would be decisively defeated, while Ambassador Oshima at that time officially predicted a German victory.

Bern #11057 (IN 16633) - 6/21/45.

C. Edward Buxton
Acting Director

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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/21 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100270005-0

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SIGNATURE RECORD SHEET

To be prepared by each TSCO upon receipt of a TOP SECRET [illegible]

[illegible] GCD [illegible] Plans, Ops & Pol Gp [illegible]	[illegible] Chiefs [illegible]

INSTRUCTION

The TSCO named below is responsible for the attached TOP SECRET document which is charged to file of the Branch. On receipt of this form, he will immediately prepare this form as indicated, according to TOP SECRET procedures, and will obtain the signature of each person who sees the document or to whom its contents are communicated. Each person must sign his name and then he dated, and initial into the date and time of release to the next person appearing on the form. This document may be shown only to persons authorized to see TOP SECRET documents, and who are required to know the information which it contains. Each person formally charged with the safeguarding of this document (TSCO in the Branch or Office) is responsible for and must record the forwarding to the TSCO before further routing.

The attached document was received from the _____ (Branch or Office), Courier Receipt No. _____

	RELEASED	RECEIVED			RELEASED		
	DATE	SIGNATURE	DATE	TIME	INITIAL	DATE	TIME
1.	[illegible]						
2.		PHarbst	6/4	1520	CDH	6/4	15 [illegible]
3.		RTHam	6/4	15 [illegible]	RT	6/4	15 [illegible]
4.		CSCBot [illegible]	6/4	1622	CSC/nr	6/5	09 [illegible]
5.		RC [illegible]	6/5	0900	DC	6/5	09 [illegible]
6.		CS Cha [illegible]	6/5	0930	CSC/nr	6/5	10 [illegible]
7.		GLDA [illegible]	6/5	1130	GLDA	6/5	14 [illegible]
8.		RTH [illegible]	6/5	1500	RT	6/5	15 [illegible]
9.		[illegible]	6/5	1600	[illegible]	6/5	[illegible]
10.							
11.	[illegible]						

As soon as the officials concerned have read this document, the TSCO must sign on line 11 below, take same from the document and retain it as a permanent record of the [illegible]. He must then deliver the document by Officer Courier to the next [illegible] listed on the release Routing Sheet attached to this document.

The attached document was released to the _____ (Branch or Office), Courier Receipt No. _____

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ROUTING SHEET

To be prepared by the first TSCO who receives a TOP SECRET document.

DESCRIPTION	REGISTRY
FROM: G-2	ACCESSION NO.: DoTS 775
ADDRESSED TO: Pres Sec'y, JCS	
DOCUMENT DATE: 4 June 45	ACCESSION DATE: 4 June 45
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1943

Colonel Buxton:

Attached for your signature are memoranda addressed to the President, the Secretary of State, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, concerning alleged Japanese peace feelers. Bern cable #10569, dated 2 June.

For General Magruder

C. T., Jr.

per Stf

[illegible]

John Magruder, Brig. Gen.
Deputy Director, OSS -- Intelligence Service

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

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CONTROL

4 June 1945

Miss Rose Conway
The White House

Dear Miss Conway:

I believe the President will be interested in the enclosed report from our representative in Bern.

Sincerely yours,

C. Edward Buxton
Acting Director

Enclosure.

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4 June 1945

CONTROL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following information, transmitted by the OSS representative in Bern on 2 June, is a sequel to memorandum dated 12 May 1945 concerning an alleged Japanese peace feeler. The source of the information is the same German authority on the Far East who is considered anti-Nazi but pro-Japanese:

Source is in touch with Fujimura, who is understood to be one of the principal Japanese naval representatives in Europe and a former Assistant Naval Attache in Berlin. Fujimura is reported to be in direct and secret contact by cable with the Japanese Minister of Marine [Navy ?] and is believed to enjoy the confidence of the Japanese Government.

Fujimura indicated to source that the Navy circles who now control [?] the Japanese Government would be willing to surrender but wish, if possible, to save some face from the present wreckage. These Navy circles, he declares, particularly stress the necessity of preserving the Emperor in order to avoid Communism and chaos. Fujimura emphasizes that Japan can not supply itself with basically essential foodstuffs and is

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dependent upon Korea for sugar and rice. He also insists that Japan needs to retain some of its merchant marine for necessary food imports.

G. Edward Buxton
Acting Director

Bern #10589 (IN 14918) - 2 June 1945.

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4 June 1945

Honorable James C. Dunn
Assistant Secretary of State
Department of State

Dear Mr. Dunn:

The Secretary will probably be interested in the enclosed message from the OSS representative in Bern.

Sincerely yours,

G. Edward Buxton
Acting Director

Enclosure.

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4 June 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

The following information, transmitted by the OSS representative in Bern on 2 June, is a sequel to a memorandum dated 12 May 1945 concerning an alleged Japanese peace feeler. The source of the information is the same German authority on the Far East who is considered anti-Nazi but pro-Japanese:

Source is in touch with Fujimura, who is understood to be one of the principal Japanese naval representatives in Europe and a former Assistant Naval Attache in Berlin. Fujimura is reported to be in direct and secret contact by cable with the Japanese Minister of Marine [Navy ?] and is believed to enjoy the confidence of the Japanese Government.

Fujimura indicated to source that the Navy circles who now control [?] the Japanese Government would be willing to surrender but wish, if possible, to save some face from the present wreckage. These Navy circles, he declares, particularly stress the necessity of preserving the Emperor in order to avoid Communism and chaos. Fujimura emphasizes that Japan cannot supply

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itself with basically essential foodstuffs and is dependent upon Korea for sugar and rice. He also insists that Japan needs to retain some of its merchant marine for necessary food imports.

G. Edward Buxton
Acting Director

Bern #10489 (IN 14918) - 2 June 1945.

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4 June 1945

CONTROL

MEMORANDUM OF INFORMATION
FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:

SUBJECT: Alleged Japanese Peace Feelers.

The following information, transmitted by the OSS representative in Bern on 2 June, is a sequel to a memorandum dated 12 May 1945 concerning an alleged Japanese peace feeler. The source of the information is the same German authority on the Far East who is considered anti-Nazi but pro-Japanese:

Source is in touch with Fujimura, who is understood to be one of the principal Japanese naval representatives in Europe and a former Assistant Naval Attache in Berlin. Fujimura is reported to be in direct and secret contact by cable with the Japanese Minister of Marine (Navy ?) and is believed to enjoy the confidence of the Japanese Government.

Fujimura indicated to source that the Navy circles who now control (?) the Japanese Government would be willing to surrender but wish, if possible, to save some face from the present wreckage. These Navy circles, he declares, particularly stress the necessity of preserving the Emperor in order to avoid Communism and chaos. Fujimura emphasizes that Japan cannot supply itself with basically essential foodstuffs and is dependent upon Korea for sugar and rice. He also insists that Japan needs to retain some of its merchant marine for necessary food imports.

G. Edward Buxton
Acting Director

Bern #10509 (IN 14918) - 2 June 1945.

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